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PREFACE 
In the summer of 2018, I participated in Sogang University’s Korean Immersion Program 
(KIP; hereafter KIP) in Seoul, South Korea (hereafter Korea). Anxious to observe the 
methodological tradition of my discipline – ethnography – appreciating both the variety of 
expression unique to spoken language (Boas 1940), and the value of spoken language as a 
privileged interface into social phenomena (Moerman 1988), I made it my priority to improve 
my Korean language skills over the summer. At the suggestion of my advisor, I decided that 
enrolling in an intensive language program would be optimal, as these types of programs are 
designed to advance students’ speaking skills in a short amount of time.  
I found the KIP pamphlet pinned up in the Korean Literature department at my home 
university. The pamphlet read as follows: “The Korean Immersion Program is a four week long 
program designed to help students improve their Korean language skills and learn more about 
Korean culture” (Sogang University 2018). When I asked the director of Korean Literature if this 
program was worthwhile, she replied by saying that “this is the one we recommend.” I spent 
some time researching Korean language programs on the internet and most reviews concurred 
that Sogang offered the best language program for foreigners looking for intensive language 
training. Of the other possible Korean universities to choose from, places like Seoul National 
University and Yonsei University had poor online reviews and were furthermore notorious for 
being party spots for foreigners. Reviews written for Sogang on the other hand emphasized the 
centrality of classroom time and speaking practice. Certainly, on the first day of the program, my 
expectations in this regard were on their way to being met. 
 When I checked into my dorm, I saw that one of my roommates had already arrived. 
Andrew was a 25-year-old office worker from Malaysia who was in Korea on vacation. Having 
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already developed an appreciable interest in K-pop music (Korea’s export-driven pop music 
genre), Andrew believed that enrolling in KIP and saturating himself in Korean language and 
culture was the natural next step in his commitment to his hobby. We introduced ourselves, 
began talking, and quickly hit it off. After chatting for a few minutes, Bradley, the third 
roommate, entered the room. Bradley was a 19-year old Korean-American from San Diego, 
California, who had recently graduated high school. Bradley’s parents had enrolled him in KIP 
with the goal of bringing him up to fluency before he moved away to college. Bradley’s parents, 
both native-born Koreans, chose Sogang since it was their own alma matter and was where they 
first met. Bradley’s father, who followed close behind with a video camera, tried to capture every 
second of his son’s first moments at the university, including his reaction to his new dorm and 
new roommates, which were lackluster at best. The three of us roommates posed for a picture 
taken by Bradley’s father, after which Bradley hastily departed, leaving his father to follow 
closely behind, and thereby concluding Bradley’s embarrassing ordeal.  
 My two roommates, Andrew and Bradley, represent two common demographics of 
students that I observed at KIP. It quickly became apparent to me that many of my colleagues at 
KIP shared a common enthusiasm for Hallyu (an umbrella term for a range of Korean cultural 
exports that typically includes K-pop, dramas, and movies), while another much smaller 
selection of students were foreign-born ethnic Koreans, sent to Sogang by their parents, to which 
they unenthusiastically acceded. Interspersed amongst the K-pop fans and pilgrims were also a 
few professionals seeking Korean language skills as a way to gain a competitive edge in their 
careers. In addition, there were some foreigners whom, because they had Korean spouses, were 
looking to improve their Korean language skills as a way to make favorable impressions on their 
spouses’ families. Then there was myself.   
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 Though it might be impossible to address all the reasons why I found myself at KIP this 
summer in 2018, it would be safe to say that a large part of it had to do with a musical practice 
called hardcore. Hardcore, a worldwide underground music scene that I have been involved in 
for most of my life, is a chronological derivative of British punk; a genre that had historically 
been evoked in the first sociological discussions of “youth culture” and “subculture” (Hall and 
Jefferson 1976; Hebdige 1979; Brake 1985). After earning my undergraduate degree in 2011 and 
finding employment as an English teacher in Korea, I quickly fell into Korea’s thriving hardcore 
scenes. And although professional interests are what originally brought me to Korea, it was the 
lasting connections and friendships that I had made in Korea’s hardcore scenes that motivated 
me to learn Korean, that inspired my current academic interests, and that kept me in Korea for 
three years.  
Then in 2015, after returning to California, Korea seemed to reach out to me once again 
through yet another subcultural link: fixed gear cycling. Fixed gear bicycles have been a 
mainstay of city bicycle couriers in cities such as New York, Boston, Portland, and San 
Francisco since the profession began in the 1800s (Singel 2005; Weyland 2007; Buckheit 2009). 
In recent years however, fixed gear bikes have become a niche youth hobby all around the world, 
inspiring new creative fixed gear-related activities and races, one of them being street criterium 
races. Having moved back to my home town of Long Beach, California, I took a part time job as 
a local bicycle courier. As it turned out, the owners of this local courier business were members 
of a fixed gear race team, whose founder was a Korean-American. As such, the team participated 
in annual and semi-annual events in Seoul. Through my friends and co-workers in Long Beach, I 
was able to meet other cycling enthusiasts from Korea. My casual connection to this other 
underground culture begot new friendships in Korea, some of which were renewed when I 
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returned in 2018. Again, the professional interests that had initially brought me to Korea seemed 
to take on new meaning as they converged with my other niche interests. The friendships and 
connections that I had made in Korea’s hardcore and cycling scenes have fostered my continued 
interest in Korea, and would eventually inspire my current academic interests. And although 
these other subcultural interests only appear in passing throughout this thesis, it was my 
experiences in these communities that inevitably brought me to Sogang, inspired my research 
interest in popular culture and subculture, and I believe, ultimately allowed me to recognize 
subcultural activity at Sogang. Furthermore, the fact that I, along with my colleagues at Sogang, 
all found ourselves funneled into the KIP program despite our divergent interests and various 
entry points into Korea, is demonstrative of a dynamic that lays at the heart of this thesis.   
Where applicable, this thesis will follow the McCune-Reischaur system for Korean 
romanization. Korean-origin terms that already have widely recognized standard romanized 
forms such as “Sogang” and “Hallyu” will appear as is in their popular forms, or as they have 
appeared in my sources. All proper interviews herein were conducted primarily in English, 
recorded with a voice recorder, and later transcribed. Some intermittent Korean language appears 
in selected interviews. Where respondents have used Korean interspersed in otherwise primarily 
English interviews, I have provided a romanized form of their Korean utterances followed by a 
bracketed English translation. In instances where no formal interview was conducted, but Korean 
was used, such as in casual conversations or one-off questions, translations and/or paraphrases 
have been provided entirely by myself, transcribed from hand-written notes and memory. In 
several of my English interviews, English was not the first language of the interviewee. In the 
case of Andrew, English was near-fluent, and so was chosen out of convenience. However, in the 
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case of Lucia, English was rudimentary, but was preferred by the interviewee – a dynamic that 
receives analysis later in this thesis. 
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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
 
 
To Make a Dream Circle: Searching for Subculture Within the Korean Wave 
 
by 
Corey Scott Howard 
Master of Arts in Anthropology  
University of California San Diego, 2019 
 
Professor Joseph D. Hankins, Chair 
 
 “Hallyu,” a term meaning “Korean Wave,” refers to the ever-expanding cache of export-
driven Korean cultural products that, since the 1990s, has primarily included dramas, pop music, 
film, and animation (Yong 2016, 3). As an industry that generated 6 billion USD in 2016 
(Korea.net 2019), and that commands roughly 35 million fans worldwide (The Korea Herald 
2016), Hallyu has become a formidable economic force that other domestic industries have 
found lucrative alliances with (Choi 2015, 37-38). Further, the substantial direct support that 
Hallyu has received from the South Korean government since 2008 and that which has led to the 
broadening of the Hallyu repertoire to include new forms such as games, food, electronics, and 
language (Yong 2016, 5; Choi 2015, 44) makes South Korea and its cultural industry a 
 xiii 
compelling case study for observing how cultural forms become naturalized as they converge 
with economics and government agendas. This thesis is an investigation into the categories of 
“popular culture” and “subculture” as viable sociological frameworks for understanding the 
mechanics of how particular cultural forms become privileged while others become neglected. 
Utilizing interviews and observations that I collected during my one month stay at a Korean 
language university in Seoul, I demonstrate how Hallyu has been able to achieve hegemonic 
status as Korea’s granted cultural expression, and how this achievement has occasioned other 
Korean cultural industries to align themselves with Hallyu. I also explore the possibilities for 
marginalized actors within this hegemonic arrangement to manipulate elements of the dominant 
culture in order to meet their own need
 1 
Introduction 
 The inspiration for this thesis, and that which has comprised most of my ethnographic 
content, has been the daunting omnipresence of Korean popular culture, or “Hallyu,” throughout 
my time at KIP. Hallyu, a term meaning “Korean wave,” to put it succinctly is “meant to signify 
the tidal wave of Korean popular cultures generated outside Korea” (Choi 2015, 31). 
Traditionally, Hallyu has encompassed such formats as television dramas, film, and Korean pop 
music (hereafter K-pop) (Yong 2016, 3). But more recently, Hallyu has come to encompass more 
categories such as food, language, fashion, beauty products, and more (Choi 2015, 32). 
Commanding roughly 35 million fans worldwide (Korea Herald 2016), and cultivated by the 
multinational, localization marketing strategies of Korean entertainment companies (Kim 2017, 
2371), this wave of Korean popular culture seems to be a stark contrast from the areas of interest 
that had originally fostered my relationship with Korea. The saturation of Hallyu fans at KIP, 
juxtaposed against myself, someone who had come to Korea for academic reasons, was a source 
of perplexity for me.  
This thesis is an investigation into precisely this perplexity: how had KIP become a 
beacon for international fans of K-pop and dramas, and why was I one of the few who had been 
excluded from this circle? How did my KIP colleagues and I, despite our different entry points 
into Korea, find ourselves at KIP together? Prompted by our program’s curriculum, which 
curiously portioned almost half of our day to what were deemed “Korean cultural activities,” of 
which Hallyu was implicitly included, I paid close attention to how “Korean culture” was 
presented, and observed how my colleagues reacted to this presentation. I noted the specific 
things, images, art, people, and places that KIP chose to show to students, asked instructors how 
such representations were chosen, asked students how they felt about these representations, and 
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asked the activity subjects themselves how they believed they fit into Hallyu culture. I listened 
closely to the narratives of Korean culture and history that were being privileged throughout our 
program and contemplated which narratives were being neglected.  
This pervasiveness of “Korean culture” and/or Hallyu at KIP, championed by both our 
curriculum and by my colleagues, has led me to consider popular culture as a formidable 
sociological and economic force. Giving consideration to canonical debates on the sociological 
significance of popular culture (Benjamin 1969; Adorno 1998), and putting these in conversation 
with more contemporary ones (Frith 1989; Garofalo 1992), I weigh the hegemonic and/or 
revolutionary potential that popular culture holds in influencing mass audiences. Then, by 
considering the viability of the sociological framework of “subculture” (Hall and Jefferson 
1976), I ask what room there is for alternative constructions of Korean culture and maps of 
meaning within the parameters of a dominant ideological hegemon.  
Situated in the context of Korea, based off my observations at KIP and my interactions 
with students and instructors, I hope to arrive at a more generalizable understanding of how 
forms of popular culture are made visible to foreign audiences, how and why they appear 
attractive to audiences, and how these audiences play a feedback role in the production of these 
cultural forms. By observing the inner workings of Sogang University and reviewing the 
literature on Korean entertainment companies, I hope to offer a qualification to the power that 
these institutions have in defining Korean culture. Furthermore, I hope that the results of this 
thesis can tell us something about how the marginalized actors within this arrangement (i.e. 
consumers and those whose likenesses are co-opted by dominant narratives) might be able to use 
and transform elements of popular culture in order to create new and alternative meanings. 
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1. The Parameters and Possibilities of Popular Culture 
In order to interpret my experiences at Sogang, I evoke some of the canonical literature 
regarding popular culture and subculture. Also, as a base, I elicit Antonio Gramsci’s idea of 
hegemony, assuming both the plausibility of dominant groups to rule ideologically through the 
consent of the dominated, and the tendency of dominant groups to elaborate their ideology 
through the institutions, actors, and “feelings” of their respective societies (Gramsci 1971). 
While the barrage of activities and representations labeled as “Korean culture” at KIP initially 
struck me as an obvious attempt to naturalize a particular ideology, the juxtaposition of this 
ideological form against my own prior understanding of Korea (and later juxtaposed against one 
of my interlocutor’s experience as a Korean), prompted me to think about the possibility for 
contention within this arrangement. Thus, the popular culture debate, because it considers 
popular culture as a formidable superstructural apparatus (Adorno 1998), while also recognizing 
the slippage in strict capitalist relations inevitable in the mass reproduction media (Benjamin 
1969), is an ideal framework through which to highlight the nuance and complexity of my 
experiences at KIP, and of Hallyu culture writ large.  
1.1 Popular Music 
In his work On Popular Music, Frankfurt School theorist Theodor Adorno attempts to 
tease out the socioeconomic distinctions between what he perceives as the “two spheres of 
music”: popular music and serious music (1998, 197). Implicated in Adorno’s distinctions are 
the degree to which each sphere elicits particular reactions, naturalizes a feeling of pseudo-
individualization, and adjusts listeners to the “reality” of life (203). Fundamental to popular 
music, claims Adorno, is its tendency towards “standardization” – inevitable conformity to a set 
of conventions like song structure (the arrangement of song parts like chorus, verse, bridge, intro, 
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and outro, etc.), the reoccurrence of a predictable set of song types (like dance) and thematic 
elements (mother songs, home songs, laments for a lost girl, etc.) borrowed from a limited 
repertoire, and its formulaic adherence to uncomplicated harmonies (197-8).  
This standardization, according to Adorno, is due to popular music’s inextricable 
connection to the industrial operation of mass production (1998, 201). In a mundane cycle of 
supply and demand, popular music takes a predictable shape dictated by the current state of 
musical “tastes” leaving negligible room for creative inflection by composers (203). In this 
scheme, there exists a base set of parameters, which, through a series of hit songs that guide and 
shape, has come to represent the acceptable limits of what popular music can sound like. “As a 
result, innovations by rugged individualists have been outlawed” (202). Popular music is thus 
frozen into a set of standards and becomes “naturalized” as “official music culture” (202).  
The only room for individual artistry in this process, says Adorno, is at the hands of those 
individuals who produce the hit song in the “handicraft level” (1998, 203). The “demands” of the 
industry eventually standardize the structure of music, which “the composer, harmonizer, and 
arranger” then stylize (201). This limited stylization of a standardized framework creates for the 
consumer “ideological categories such as taste and free choice,” the naturalization of which must 
be hidden least they incite a challenge to this system (203). Adorno calls this dance between the 
“stimulatory and natural” the “desideratum” (203).  
The ability that popular music has to remain rooted in a predictable standard yet provide 
just enough stimulation so as to appear novel and elicit fetishization, according to Adorno, plays 
an important function in its continued commoditization. The limited parameters within which the 
music must operate demands no attention from the listener. Likewise, the minimal stylization 
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requires little effort from listeners since it is, by design, of an easily digestible formula. Adorno 
explains: 
Distraction is bound to the present mode of production, to the rationalized and 
mechanized process of labor to which, directly or indirectly, masses are subject. 
This mode of production, which engenders fears and anxiety about 
unemployment, loss of income, war, has its “nonproductive” correlate in 
entertainment; that is, relaxation which does not involve the effort of 
concentration at all. People want to have fun. A fully concentrated and conscious 
experience of art is possible only to those whose lives do not put such a strain on 
them in that in their spare time they want relief from both boredom and effort 
simultaneously. The whole sphere of cheap commercial entertainment reflects this 
dual desire. (Adorno 1998, 205) 
 
Thus, from this bleak picture, it seems that for Adorno, popular music precludes any 
possibility for a “conscious experience of art.” The desideratum keeps the listening audience 
phobic of any “individualizations – counter-accents and other ‘differentiations’”; they become 
conditioned to obey the naturalized formula. This obedience is not just to the formula of the 
music however, but to everyday life in general. Popular music, and the limited scope of 
acceptable stimulation it conditions, helps listeners “achieve some psychical adjustment to the 
mechanisms of present-day life” so that they can continue contributing to the current mode of 
production. And just as the music must remain structurally “natural,” it must also necessarily 
remain “aloof from political partisanship.” That is, listeners must maintain unconscious 
alignment and preference for the “natural” – what Adorno calls “crowd mindedness.” The 
psychology of crowd-mindedness keeps the masses susceptible to the authoritarian aspects of the 
political parties generally, but not to the particularities of any political leaning. Thus, popular 
music is a medium that cannot contain any social significance and is thus “repressive per se” 
(Adorno 1998, 207).  
In several ways, the nature of K-pop music and the production process of Hallyu do seem 
to ring true with Adorno’s theory of standardization. As others explain, K-pop as a genre, is a 
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lucrative industry whose content and production are driven primarily by what are called 
entertainment houses (Yong 2016, 115; Kim 2017, 2374). Popular idols and groups are all 
“systematically produced by the audition processes and in-house training systems of major 
entertainment companies” (Yong 2016, 115). The goal of this audition and training system is to 
foster an arsenal of young and talented entertainers targeted at teenage and overseas audiences 
(113-116). In total, Yong argues that, “(t)he Korean Wave phenomenon is nothing but a result of 
how Korea’s export-driven industrial system and the manufacturing sector has extended into the 
popular cultural sector” (Cho Han Hye-Jeong, as cited in Yong 2016, 116). 
 Further, in terms of song arrangements, others have noted how Korean popular music1, 
and later K-pop, have developed their musical formulae in observation of historical trends. 
Ppongjjak music for example, is a genre of Korean music originating from the Japanese colonial 
period, whose very name is an onomatopoeia for the predictable and standardized beat that 
pervades the genre (Lee 2006; Maliangkay 2006; Son 2006). Then, in the domestic types of 
Korean popular music of the 1980s, Howard (2002) notes that lyrics traditionally “conformed to 
standard romantic themes” and “avoid(ed) sexual connotations, concentrating on sentiments 
similar to the songs of earlier generations” (83). Later, with the government lifting the ban on 
foreign imports in the 1990s, musical standardization was adapted to match the newly introduced 
Euro dance styles of music, giving K-pop music a new standard “three verse” structure (Jin and 
Ryoo as cited in Yong 2016, 113). Eventually, as market demands changed and other styles 
became incorporated into Korea’s musical repertoire, K-pop’s structure shifted to one that 
“emphasizes choruses instead of verses” (Jin and Ryoo as cited in Yong 2016, 113).   
                                                        
1 Korean popular music refers to music generally consumed by domestic audiences. 
 7 
 These examples show us that, in K-pop music specifically, we can identify some of the 
criteria outlined by Adorno, thus offering some plausibility to Adorno’s framework. The 
production process of K-pop has “adapted industrial methods for the technique of its promotion” 
which includes a “division of labor among the composer, harmonizer, and arranger” (Adorno 
1998, 201). That is, entertainment companies rely on a systematic method of recruiting 
performers and engineering products aimed at maximizing the marketability of their products. 
This “competitive process,” which we can observe in the different periods of Korean popular 
music, Adorno would tell us, naturally results in standardization (201-202). In the continuous 
and gradual flux of domestic and international market demands, the expression of popular music 
thus becomes standardized in terms of structure, theme, and beat; an alleged signification of the 
music’s repressive character. 
1.2 Mass Reproduction 
Whereas Adorno looks at popular music with suspicion precisely because of its 
industrialization, Adorno’s Frankfurt colleague Walter Benjamin explores this interface between 
art and the masses with a bit more optimism. In The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction, Benjamin gives an historic overview of art’s transformation from a practice 
restricted to a singular time and place, into a form designed to reach mass audiences. Benjamin 
notes how with each new technological innovation in the quantitative reproduction of art, there 
also coincided new qualitative dynamics in the form of the work of art and in the way art could 
be received. By focusing on the possibilities that industrialization enables rather than limits, 
Benjamin’s view on art reproduction will offer a way of thinking about music and popular 
culture that may allow for more change and flexibility. 
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As Benjamin sees it, the central consequence to the reproduction of art is art’s liberation 
from its “dependence on ritual” (1969, 6). The earliest works of art, Benjamin explains, were 
restricted by their rootedness to a process of ritual, for example, a ritual of magic or religion (6). 
For unrecordable types of art, this meant that one can only receive a piece of art by being 
physically present at the time and place of its ritual creation. For other types of art like artifacts, 
replicas could be made, however slowly, to then be shared with others at other times and places. 
The Greeks, through the invention of founding and stamping, created technological means for 
reproducing items like bronzes, terra cottas, and coins in quantity (2). The printing press allowed 
for the relatively rapid reproduction of paper items, and the phonograph allowed for the 
capturing of sound art to be reproduced and shared. “(F)or the first time in world history,” 
Benjamin explains, “mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of art from is parasitical 
dependence on ritual” (6).  
One of the implications of this freeing of art from ritual is that art can now be shared 
widely; there are more opportunities for exhibition and influence (Benjamin 1969, 7). As a 
demonstration of this effect, musicologist Simon Frith recalls the growth of the rock industry. 
Frith points out that as the rock industry continued to grow following the popularity of the 
Beatles in the 1960’s, rock music became such a globally popular force among young people, 
that it eventually became too powerful and influential for institutions like universities to refuse to 
take seriously beyond its niche sociological studies (Frith 1989, 2). Demands by young people 
from all over the world prompted the founding of The International Association for the Study of 
Popular Music (IASPM) with sole purpose of getting popular music on the curriculum of 
academic music studies (1). Clearly, in this instance, music’s connectedness to multinational 
capital and new technological developments in music distribution led popular music to becoming 
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an international academic interest. “No country in the world,” Frith points out, “is unaffected by 
the way in which the twentieth-century mass media (the electronic means of musical production, 
reproduction and transmission) have created a universal pop aesthetic” (2). Recording 
technology and mass distribution obviate the need to be physically present at the time and place 
where the Beatles perform – i.e. the place of ritual – nor are the Beatles burdened with 
performing every track, on every album, every time they want to make a reproduction; their pop 
aesthetic can have an impact on many people, rather than merely those present during the ritual.  
Another important implication of mass reproduction according to Benjamin has been a 
change in the very design of the work of art. The capacity to reach mass audiences was met by 
the artist changing the design of the work of art to be received by mass audiences; the work of 
becomes “designed for reproducibility” (Benjamin 1969, 6). Where once art had mainly been 
conjured for ritual purposes, sometimes not even to be seen by an audience at all, audiences are 
now at the forefront of the mind of the designer (6). The stage actor does not perform hidden in 
solitude for religious purposes, nor as a magical rite. Rather, the actor performs to be seen by 
audiences (11). Likewise, the film actor, without a live audience, is no longer able to make 
adjustments to their performance based on the perspectives of the live audience, but rather 
performs in a particular manner consistent with the restrictions of the camera (10-11). The need 
to appeal to mass audiences necessitates that the performer interface with the audiences in a 
specific way – i.e. through the camera. 
The question still seems to remain however: is popular culture necessarily repressive, no 
matter how many people it reaches? If the popular music of the world is, as Frith contends, 
shaped by multinational capital, is it, in all of its forms, repressive as Adorno would suggest? 
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Like Adorno, Benjamin seems to recognize that the work of art can be designed with 
mass audiences in mind. For Adorno, a select few (producers, composers, and promoters) craft 
the musical product into something that the listener has, through this very process of crafting, 
been conditioned to “want”; an interpretation that assumes nefarious intentions on behalf of the 
designers, and that negates the possibility for listeners to assert their own agency in this process. 
Benjamin however, does not see the receiver of the art as a passive consumer, but as a critic 
(1998, 10). So much influence does mass reproduction impart to the common person, that the 
line between “reader” and “writer” becomes increasingly indistinguishable (12). Although the 
film maker for Benjamin may still be “trying hard to spur the interest of the masses” (13), there 
is a clear paradigm shift where “one (becomes) entitled to ask from a work of art” (14). 
Due to this dual nature of popular culture – its potential to act as an ideological apparatus 
aimed at mass audiences, and to be the subject of the discriminating interests of these mass 
audiences – Garofalo (1992) suggests that we see popular culture as a “contested terrain.” 
Garofalo explains that before the “politicized” explosion of pop music of the 1960’s, there had 
been a conception that pop music was for the mindless and passive masses, that it was devoid of 
political significance, and that it was produced only for profit (2). However, Garofalo challenges 
the rigidity of this polemic by suggesting that mass culture should be treated not merely as being 
monofunctional, but rather as a “contested terrain”: “It is regarded as one arena where 
ideological struggle – the struggle over the power to define – takes place. While there is no 
question that in this arena the forces arrayed in support of the existing hegemony are formidable, 
there are also numerous instances where mass culture – and in particular popular music – issues 
serious challenges to hegemonic power” (2). Taken in this way, we might be able to think about 
popular culture not necessarily as repressive, apolitical, and wholeheartedly in service to the 
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current mode of production, as Adorno would suggest, but rather, as a site where forces of 
complete repression, mass mindedness, and submission to capitalism, compete with forces of 
autonomy, agency, and refusal, the mastery of which, determines popular music’s expression.  
Studies by Lee (2004; 2006) demonstrate how this contesting over terrain might actually 
look in K-pop specifically. Lee notices the ways in which contemporary K-pop artists use lyrics 
as a specific site for contesting hegemony. Lee (2004) identifies “dominant representations of 
authority,” “mainstream norms and values,” and “older generations’ conservatism” as the 
primary structures against which K-pop artists contend (429). Through the coding of lyrics using 
“English mixing” in otherwise mostly Korean language song lyrics, artists are able to express 
subversive sentiments that go undetected by the non-English-speaking older generations and TV 
censors (429). In this particular situation, artists, from their place within the division of labor (as 
per Adorno), have been able to use language as a means for contesting the form of popular music 
(as per Garofalo). Though it may be unclear how these actions have been received, we see the 
possibility for actors within this arrangement to use their mass visibility and audibility as outlets 
for expression and for creating new potentials.  
Lee also observes how K-pop artists are able to contest standardization by “crossing”: 
“the use of apparently outgroup linguistic styles” (Rampton as cited in Lee 2006, 235). Some 
artists, Lee points out, are beginning to create special Japanese language versions of their songs 
in order to “cross” into the Japanese market and reach a wider audience (235). Within the 
traditionally Korean language (and to a lesser degree, English language mixed) format for K-pop 
music, Japanese language songs appear to be a break from standardized K-pop song structure. 
But, by Adorno’s definition, is this truly a deviation from the standard or merely a “stylization” 
within an otherwise “natural” framework? Are K-pop artists contesting the terrain through acts 
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of agency or merely conforming to market demands? Lee tells us that this sort of crossing should 
not be conflated with “styling the other” – that is, a cheap attempt to pass as authentic – but 
rather is a “skillful mixing of linguistic sources…(that) achieves certain indexical and semiotic 
effects” (236).  
It is suggested by Lee that in this context, we should recognize the work that crossing 
does for Korea and Japan’s historically tense cultural dynamics. Due to Korea’s colonial history 
with Japan, Korean public discourse is still rife with animosity toward Japan over territorial 
disputes, economic competition, and alleged human rights abuses. As such, Lee would have us 
see crossing as a contestation of this animosity. Performing in Japanese language, for Japanese 
audiences, and physically appearing alongside Japanese idol peers, Lee argues, acts as a 
symbolic gesture that might help alter Korean public perception towards their former colonizer 
(Lee 2006, 236). In this respect, Adorno’s criteria for popular music as being fundamentally 
devoid of political significance is perhaps inadequate here. Whether or not we know the 
intentions of K-pop idols in their acts of crossing, or whether the content of their lyrics were 
inscribed with political messages, their actions, due to the sociocultural context, seem to have 
symbolic political meaning, something that Adorno dismisses. Furthermore, if we conjure 
Benjamin here, we are able to see value in the fact that this symbolism is displayed for mass 
audiences – through televised performances and internationally distributed records – thus 
demonstrating popular music’s potential to act as a revolutionary force. 
1.3 Sub-culture 
The above examples help us to see some of the practical implications of using popular 
music as a workable term in general, while also letting us see the extent to which Adorno’s 
framework holds up in the popular music realm of K-pop specifically – a significant milepost in 
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this particular investigation. But, our demystification of the concept of “popular” should also 
coincide with an examination of the category that supposedly exists as its opposite: “sub-
culture.” 
Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, in their work on British “youth sub-culture,” offer a class 
analysis of how to think about the idea of a sub-culture. As Hall and Jefferson see it, classes are 
the most fundamental groups in modern society, each of which exists within a major cultural 
configuration (1976, 13).  
These major cultural configurations are structured by their own “maps of meaning”:  
A culture includes the ‘maps of meaning’ which make things 
intelligible to its members. These ‘maps of meaning’ are not 
simply carried around in the head: they are objectivated in the 
patterns of social organization and relationship through which the 
individual becomes a ‘social individual’. Culture is the way the 
social relations of a group are structured and shaped: but it is also 
the way those shapes are experienced, understood and interpreted. 
(Hall and Jefferson 1976, 10-11) 
 
Thus, individuals and groups within the major cultural configuration must work within 
the “field of possibles” [sic] historically laid out by this dominant arrangement (11).  
However, this dominant culture “is never a homogenous structure” (Hall and Jefferson 
1976, 12). We should also recognize that within the dominant culture there are “sub-cultures”: 
“sub-sets – smaller, more localized and differentiated structures” whom also hold their own 
values, meanings, and experiences (13). “(L)oosely or tightly bounded,” sub-cultures are 
distinguished by their differentiated practices and meanings and by their sub-structural territories 
(12-14). They necessarily exist within the parameters of their “parent culture,” but “(t)hrough 
dress, activities, leisure pursuits and life-style, they may project a different cultural response or 
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‘solution’ to the problems posed for them by their material and social class position and 
experience” (15). 
 And although not homogenous, the dominant culture, according to Hall and Jefferson, 
commands “cultural power”: the ability to control “mental production,” setting “(t)he definitions 
of the world” (1976, 11). Thus, this explanation sees each group as being opposed to one another 
and placed along a hierarchy where some groups will necessarily dominate, and some will be 
subordinate in their command of “cultural power” (11). With this power, the dominant groups 
will be able to have prioritized expression and representation of their particular “maps of 
meaning” within the society (11). 
 Sharing this Marxist framework in common with Adorno, Hall and Jefferson’s viewpoint 
places great emphasis on the determining power of production, recognizing that the classes 
whom command the means of material production will also command mental production (Marx 
1970, 64 as cited in Hall and Jefferson 1976, 11). In Adorno’s figuring, production has an 
inevitable inclination towards standardization and distraction. Production, in its course for profit, 
must make “natural” or “standard” the desirability of its products, the consumption of which 
offers the listener enough distraction and leisure to secure their continued replication of the mode 
of production. At this point, Hall and Jefferson can supplement Adorno’s framework by adding 
that a particular class will necessarily be in control of the current mode of production. This 
dominant class will have monopoly over the “maps of meaning” of a society (11). We might thus 
be able to draw an analogy between what Adorno calls the “promoters of commercialized 
entertainment” and the dominate class mentioned by Hall and Jefferson (Adorno 1998, 205). 
Like the dominant class, Adorno names promoters as the “operative agencies” who shape mass 
consciousness (205). Promoters aim to cultivate a particular ideology, a “frozen” set of natural 
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standards, that allows them to continue “selling cultural commodities indiscriminately” (202, 
205).  
From this analogy, we can see the ways in which Adorno’s analysis is in agreement with 
Hall and Jefferson’s more general explanation of dominate and subordinate groups. Adorno, and 
Hall and Jefferson, both seem to show that there are dominant groups who maintain cultural 
power and seek to have their own maps of meaning elaborated in society. And, in their use of 
Gramsci’s interpretation of hegemony, Hall and Jefferson corroborate Adorno’s idea of 
standardization – that dominate maps of meaning become naturalized. Further, Hall and 
Jefferson’s subcultural analysis, synthesized with Adorno, corroborates our synthesis of Frith 
and Garofalo: the expression of popular music is given significant shape by the forces of capital, 
yet is not granted or absolute, but, as suggested by the presence and calculated work of dominate 
class actors, ought to be seen as a contested terrain; a specific site where we can observe the 
struggle for hegemony over cultural products and ideologies.  
So, if popular music is not repressive per se, as Adorno suggests, but is a contested form, 
what do we make of his term antipodal to popular music: “serious music”? Unlike popular 
music, which Adorno characterizes foremost by its standardization, a characterization which I 
have since problematized, serious music, according to Adorno, does not adhere to a “rigidity of 
whose pattern is understood” (1998, 198). Rather, in serious music, “(e)very detail derives its 
musical sense from the concrete totality of the piece which, in turn, consists of the life 
relationship of the details and never of a mere enforcement of a musical scheme…Only through 
the whole does it acquire its particular lyrical and expressive quality” (198). 
Though cryptic perhaps, Adorno’s definition of serious music rings of a subcultural 
essence. Whereas popular music, by Adorno’s reasoning, is repressive by nature of its repetitive 
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structure, serious music does not “supply the ‘framework’ automatically” (1998, 199). Serious 
music does not rely on the effect of desideratum; that is, it does not appeal to the listener by 
adding inflections to a natural form, the character of which are of such superficial and 
predictable quality that they can be appreciated at any isolated moment in the song. Rather, 
serious music, in order to be appreciated, must be taken with consideration to its entire form. 
Unlike in popular music, in serious music, each part, theme, or bar “gets its true meaning only 
from the context” (198). “Taken in isolation (a) theme would be disrobed to insignificance” 
(198). Therefore, the standardization that becomes naturalized through popular music, both in 
terms of the song’s structure, and in the habituation that this structure engenders in the listener, is 
contested. Whereas popular music gives the listener something “pre-digested” to consume, 
serious music requires contemplation. The structuring effect of the music stimuli is no longer 
potent because there is no longer a uniform structure to speak of. Instead of cursory inflections 
juxtaposed against an otherwise unquestioned musical form, there is now a dynamic whole 
whose pronounced form requires steady attention. The effect is “that of disillusion” (207). 
Whereas Adorno stresses the structuring effect of popular music, serious music is not 
described with the same assertive counter-effect as perhaps the idea of a contested field might. 
Rather, Adorno’s description of serious music expresses a sense of “disillusion” and 
“acceptance” to a neutral “raw reality” (1998, 207). Though he does use the descriptor 
“antiromantic” to characterize performers of serious music, there is less in his words to suggest a 
contestation than merely an absence of romance. Faced with a recognition of the bleak reality of 
the “machine age” that popular music naturalizes, composers of serious music aim to adapt 
themselves to this reality (207). “Listeners are ready to replace dreaming by adjustment to raw 
reality” (207). Rather bleakly, Adorno describes this adjustment as a coming to terms with the 
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fact that “they (the audience and composers of serious music) actually have no part in happiness” 
(208). “The actual function of sentimental music lies rather in the temporary release given to the 
awareness that one has missed fulfillment” (208). But, alas, Adorno does not see this release as a 
contestation to the standardization of the “machine age.” For Adorno, “(o)ne who weeps does not 
resist any more than one who marches” (208).  
However, in regard to Adorno’s explanation of serious music’s functionality, we should 
first take issue with his assumption of a “raw reality.” Granted, based on Gramsci’s definition of 
hegemony, we can concede that actors all come onto the same “terrain” of economic production. 
But, as Gramsci also tells us, “it is not possible to separate what is known as ‘scientific’ 
philosophy from the common and popular philosophy which is only a fragmentary collection of 
ideas and opinions” (1971, 328). That is, there is no objective “raw reality” that Adorno’s 
antiromantics are able to perceive. Rather, there are any number of competing definitions of 
reality that hegemony attempts to subsume within its range thus maintaining the unity of the 
social bloc (Gramsci 1971, 328; Hall and Jefferson 1976, 39; Williams 1977, 122-123). Thus, 
perhaps unintentionally, Adorno’s explanation actually reinforces our running concept of a 
contested field. It is not that the practitioners and listeners of serious music have discovered 
some “truth,” but that they have arrived at an alternative interpretation, or “fragmentary 
collection of ideas and opinions” (Gramsci 1971, 328). Whereas we might think of Adorno’s 
version of popular music as attempting to structure listeners into an “ideological unity” of taking 
pleasure from their place in the mode of production, serious music facilitates a feeling of 
antiromanticism towards this position.  
The idea of antiromanticism would certainly corroborate Hall and Jefferson’s 
understanding of subcultural resistance as well. “The subordinate class,” they tell us, “brings to 
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this ‘theatre of struggle’ a repertoire of strategies and responses – ways of coping as well as of 
resisting” (1976, 44). And though these strategies and responses are forms of resistance, we 
should also remember that they are only contestations of meaning; a grab at cultural power. For 
as Hall and Jefferson remind us via Marx, the subcultural class is only allotted the same “raw 
materials” as their parent class (45). Thus, the antiromantics, in their recognition of the mode of 
production, develop a coping mechanism that draws from the same repertoire of raw materials as 
do popular musicians, to negotiate the meaning of their existence, thereby collectively creating 
an alternative set of meaning that sits in contestation to the dominant meaning.  
 In sum, though the theoretical concepts of “popular music” and “subculture” have been 
my speculative points of departure, they require some clarifications if they are to serve as 
workable frameworks for understanding my ethnographic experiences. First, by Adorno’s 
reasoning, the base structure of popular music, by way of its responsiveness to market demands, 
has become naturalized and removed from perceivability. The musical inflections added to this 
natural base, as points of attraction to the listener, periodically offer relief and distraction, and 
simultaneously condition a frame of mind that seeks this distraction as leisure so that the listener 
can feel relived and feel justified in continually contributing to the current mode of production. 
As Yong would suggest, there have been in fact several recognizable standard structural 
formulae in the history of Korean popular music and in K-pop. Yong also confirms Adorno’s 
suggestion that there is a clear division of labor to be observed in K-pop between individuals 
who make up the entertainment companies, and those idols who are the performers. From this 
synthesis, we can conclude, quite safely, that the structure K-pop conforms to certain market 
pressures, and, by way of entertainment companies and their recruitment systems, adhere to an 
industrial pattern that seeks to maximize profits.  
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 But, as Benjamin’s analysis would suggest, and Lee’s examples demonstrate, the 
industrialization and mass reproducibility of K-pop music does not necessarily imply an absolute 
repressive nature. Rather, through covert, individual acts of agency by idols, that entail the 
appropriation of the very platform given to them by K-pop, idols are able to make structural 
contestations against the musical form, and likewise, against the ideological structure, of which, 
the musical structure is a material and social component. Supported by Hall and Jefferson’s 
theorization of subcultures – groups that may appropriate the materials of their parent cultures 
and imbue them with new meaning – we can think of these instances of “mixing” and “crossing” 
by K-pop idols as examples of the “struggle over the power to define” (Garofalo 1992). For 
although the sphere of popular music is no doubt, as Adorno might suggest, repressive, it is, as 
Garofalo argues, not absolute, and is merely one arena out of presumably many, where 
hegemony is contested.  
 Further, as Garofalo would suggest, serious music can perhaps be thought of as another 
arena where hegemony is contested. For Adorno, the non-standard structural quality of serious 
music allows listeners to see, unoccluded, the “raw reality” that is the mode of production of 
which they are a part. However, instead of conceding, as Adorno does, that perceiving this raw 
reality is the terminus of a struggle that serious music is unfit to partake in, we can instead think 
of this disillusion as yet another reinterpretation of the maps of meaning that hegemony attempts 
to naturalize. In this sense, Adorno does not seem to give enough credit to serious music, or other 
means, to reimage dominant ideology. Taken altogether, popular music appears to have, in its 
intimacy with industrialization, great repressive potential. But, for this same reason, also has 
formidable counter-hegemonic potential. Serious music, or subcultures, likewise may have 
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different relationships to the current mode of production, but nonetheless, are subsumed into 
dominant hegemonic narratives, and so are also contested terrains.  
 As I transition into my ethnographic data, I aim to elucidate further the specific strategies 
adopted by groups we might consider subcultures, to contest cultural power, and assert their 
own. For acknowledging the privileged access that some subcultures have to degrees of mass 
reproduction is merely a preliminary articulation of a much more sophisticated dynamic and that 
which promises many other possibilities.  
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2. Korean Immersion Program 
Though at first it appeared that Sogang was going to provide me with the regimented 
language instruction that I sought, it soon became clear that language instruction was not KIP’s 
sole priority and that there were alternative agendas undergirding the structure of the program. 
Likewise, as the days of the program unfolded, it became obvious that my colleagues and I 
diverged in our purposes for coming to Korea and for enrolling in a Korean language program. 
On the first day of instruction for example, each student was given a contract to sign where we 
pledged to speak only Korean for the duration of the program. However, as the days went by, 
instructors and students began speaking less and less Korean, reverting instead to English. 
Moments of instruction in English by the teachers seemed to create a precedent for students to 
use English, which only seemed to reinforce the teachers’ passivity, leading then to the eventual 
bleed over of English into all of our program interactions. And although our language contracts 
gestured at professionalism, other such inner workings of the program made them increasingly 
difficult to manage. How then can we understand this failure? 
I interpret this discontinuity that I experienced at Sogang University – an institution 
renowned for its quality language training – as a compromise between an intention to provide 
language instruction for educational purposes on the one hand, and the necessity to collect on, 
what media scholar JungBong Choi calls, a “leaky” or “fuzzy” wave of Korean cultural products 
on the other hand (2015, 33). Grounded in my own ethnographic data and supplemented by 
current scholarship on the Korean Wave phenomenon, I arrive at my interpretation by noting 
KIP’s strategic appropriation of a plethora of people, places, items, activities, and narratives. As 
per Adorno, we can understand KIP’s selection of these particular elements as a natural 
expression of a coherent set of standardized entertainment conventions, given direction by 
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“composers,” and given shape by the “wants” of mass (foreign) audiences. Yet I show that it is 
by this same mass audience-oriented dynamic, as alluded to by Benjamin, and demonstrated by 
Lee, that allows subcultural groups and individuals to push back against the rigidity of this 
arrangement in order to meet their own needs. I note that none of these struggles for cultural 
power are, in the end, zero-sum games, but are contestations resulting in negotiated cultural 
forms, representations, narratives, meanings, and uses. Whether it be KIP’s partitioning of 
“language” and “culture” wedged even further apart by the need to provide cultural instruction in 
English, K-pop fans negotiating the terms of their engagement with idols, or the artists 
themselves who resist their own absorption into Hallyu, each contestation that I look at gains 
some degree of counter-hegemonic ground while also conceding some. However, since it is 
Hallyu culture that remains economically dominant throughout, like serious music, counter-
hegemonic contestations are qualified by the alternative meanings that they bring to subcultures.  
2.1 Language and Culture 
One particular dynamic of the program that made speaking only Korean difficult to 
police was the fact that our daily class schedule was divided into two clearly demarcated 
subjects: “language” and “culture.” Although we did sign contracts for our culture class, and our 
culture instructor was clearly diligent about upholding Korean-only instruction, these classes, 
with the exception of a few meetings, were actually not taught by our main instructor, but were 
relegated to other staff, students, and outside instructors. Further, these deferred classes were 
almost always in other non-classroom settings, on campus or off campus entirely. This splitting 
of class subjects into distinct “language” and “culture” classes, along with the inconsistency in 
instruction, and the blurring of academic settings with more casual, fun settings, I believe, was a 
reflection of KIP’s entanglement in a dominant cluster of representations of Korea that aims to 
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capture foreign audiences by giving them what Adorno calls the “stuff” they “want” (1998, 205); 
“stuff” that becomes attractive through what Jean and John Comaroof have described as the 
construction of ethno-national “brands” that more and more nations are attempting to assert into 
the world marketplace in search for economic “empowerment” and global-political “self-
construction” (2009, 1-7).  
For four hours in the morning, beginning at 9 A.M., my KIP colleagues and I attended 
our language courses – one for speaking and listening, and one for reading and writing. Then, 
after an hour lunch break, we would all reconvene at the place where our two-hour culture class 
would be held that day. Generally, each culture class was focused on showing students one 
particular type of art, craft, food, music, or dance that students were required to partake in. These 
activities included cooking, calligraphy, a traditional scarf dance, stamp making, a field trip to 
the Korean War Memorial Museum, traditional mask dancing, taekwondo, a field trip to a 
Japanese colonial-era prison, and a traditional paper game. In addition to these class-specific 
activities, during our third week, culture class was divided into three activities, of which, 
students could choose one that they would participate in for three days. These included a K-pop 
dance routine, a Korean traditional musical instrument concert, and a visit to a Buddhist temple. 
Then, every Friday, there was a program-wide optional field trip organized by the program 
director, which students were encouraged to attend. These cultural field trips included a baseball 
game, an amusement park, a musical comedy show, and a semi-private K-pop concert. 
The peculiar partitioning of “language” and “culture” by KIP in this way makes these two 
categories fascinating objects of ethnographic inquiry; fascinating because some classic 
anthropological understandings of language and culture would find redundant the task of 
studying the two apart from one another (Salzmann 2004, 3). That is because by such definitions, 
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culture is understood to be a collection of behavioral innovations that humans have adapted in 
response to their biological restrictions, language being merely an elaboration of this cultural 
innovation (3). For example, as pointed out by Salzmann (2004), early 19th century linguist 
Edward Sapir saw language as “a guide to ‘social reality’,” something that “powerfully 
conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes” (44). Similarly, Benjamin Lee 
Whorf also laid out a hypothesis that presumed that humans “dissect nature along lines laid down 
by our native languages” (45). Thus, for these theorists, it is implied that understanding one’s 
language is integral to understanding one’s culture. The KIP brochure that I saw pinned-up in my 
home university’s Korean language department seemed to echo this common understanding: 
“Students spend the afternoons taking interactive culture classes. In addition, students take 
outings into the city with their instructors or teaching assistants to complete assignments that 
help them practice their Korean language skills in a real world setting. Destinations included 
historical sites and other local points of interest. Students will also participate in culture-related 
group projects with Korean college students” (Sogang University 2018). The emphasis that the 
brochure places on using language in “real world settings” including “historical sites” suggests a 
recognition of language as something at least partially connected to a corresponding social 
world. 
However, regardless of the practical reasons for observing such a theoretical distinction – 
reasons that KIP may or may not have recognized themselves – I find KIP’s separation of 
language and culture classes to be a phenomenon better understood as an historic ideological 
distinction. Drawing on Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, I think of language and 
culture as two expressions of “nation-ness,” “the most universally legitimate value in the 
political life of our time” (2006, 3). Anderson argues that in ancient proto-national communities, 
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language, in the form of a written script, was once the primary means for empires to distinguish 
one another (13-14). But, with the decline of this primary conception of community, arose the 
primacy of visual and aural representations as embodiments of community (22). Citing the 
presence of particular types of dress, stained glass windows, reliefs, oral sermons, plays, and 
relics in mediaeval Christendom, Anderson demonstrates how these new visual and aural 
representations were able to signal the conception of their sacred community to the illiterate 
masses (23). Though both of these categories – language and culture – have historically been 
separate and have only been arbitrarily brought together, they exist now as two sub-categories of 
the larger umbrella category of “nation.” Thus, highlighting the distinction between language and 
culture as KIP does, while also placing them alongside one another in our academic day, is an 
indication of the shared purpose of these categories to “immerse” students in the multiple 
expressions of “most legitimate” category of nation. Much in the same way that Benjamin 
explains how mass reproduction releases the art form from its ritual origin, Anderson shows how 
visual and aural representations became a way to signal the idea of “community” to a greater 
number of people. But how and why has community come to be the object of commodification 
in this way?  
In addition to recognizing the historic precedent for separable categories of “language” 
and “culture” and their relation to an essence of “community,” we can also understand Korea – 
the community and/or the nation – as an identity which has been claimed and made salient due to 
its economic exploitability (Povinelli 2001; Comaroff 2009; Dávila 2012). Economic 
empowerment, securing a global market presence for the future, and identifying something 
unique about one’s people in a world where “authenticity” is becoming dependent on both of the 
former, are just a few of the reasons that John L. and Jean Comaroff have identified as being 
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reasons why “culture” as an alienable form has increasingly become the object of 
commoditization (2009, 6-10). In the wake of the growing global popularity of Hallyu, I see the 
national essence of Korea as a category that has been opportunistically identified and made to 
include “culture” and “language,” among other things. 
To this end, Choi (2015) sees the branding of Korea mostly as a convenient means for 
various sectors in Korea’s creative industry to sell cultural products (38). Due to the general 
tendency for human interest categories to become compartmentalized yet still able to “crisscross” 
with one another, Choi sees “Korea” as something that has become a grand category for various 
sub-realms of human interest such as language, culture, and other things; a dynamic that allows 
fans to seamlessly transition from one realm of interest to the next (35). And although for people 
like myself, Hallyu was not my entry point into the Korean brand, the relatively greater 
popularity of Hallyu – the “essential content” – over things like language training – the “Para-
Hallyu products/services” – as Choi presents them (34), and that my own data will corroborate, 
appears to be able to capture masses of foreign audiences where language alone does not. 
Furthermore, precisely because the historically situated archetypical meaning and use of culture 
as a concept may differ from the various ways it is continuously deployed (Williams 1977, 121; 
Trouillot 2003, 98), Hallyu as an open-ended and supposed “cultural” category may also be 
deployed to incorporate more realms of human artifact and behavior (Choi 2015, 32), including 
language. We can observe this process of incorporation at KIP. The fact that Sogang University 
is first and foremost an institution of higher education, and that KIP belongs specifically to 
Sogang’s Korean Language Education Center (KLEC), yet has still made a substantial partition 
of our day in order to make room for a culture class that was nearly devoid of any linguistic 
pedagogical value, is an indication of the substantial weight that “culture” in this context carries 
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over language in evoking the Korean brand. This point I believe is central to understanding 
KIP’s categorical division between language and culture as a compromise.  
2.2 Co-constituting Content 
If Anderson can help us understand the historical precedent for the distinction between 
language and culture as they have been presented by KIP, how then do we make sense of their 
continued alliance? How is this specific array of cultural representations used by KIP and what 
work does it do? Rather than invoking some “true,” “natural,” or “primordial base of the Korean 
people,” as Korean historian Clark Sorensen has warned against (1999, 288), I argue that the 
representations that KIP presented to us are expressions of a hegemonic and constantly 
fluctuating narrative of what constitutes Korea and Korean culture. This dominant narrative of 
Korean culture I believe is intimately connected to a mode of production that depends on, to a 
degree, the ability to sell Korean cultural products “indiscriminately” as Adorno would suggest; 
an arrangement that Marx calls commanding “mental production” (Marx as cited in Hall and 
Jefferson 1976, 11). This codependency between the naturalization of a particular, yet an 
expanding, set of Korean cultural images, and the ability to sell these images to foreign 
audiences, was further demonstrated by interviews that I collected from my culture teacher and 
the KIP program director. What these conversations demonstrate are both the existence of a 
dominant and natural understanding of what Korean culture is, and the presence of an ideology 
that finds it necessary to give foreign audiences the “stuff they want.”  
As is pointed out by many scholars of Korean Wave (Choi, 2015; Yong, 2016; Yoon, 
2017), since the 1990s, the Korean government has had a heavy hand in the development of 
Hallyu, stimulating creativity in the culture industry by sponsoring entertainment companies and 
entrepreneurs. In this hunt for new avenues of developing Korea’s soft power and “symbolic 
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capital,” other non-Hallyu sectors have been prone to becoming co-opted and subsumed into 
Hallyu’s porous boundaries (Choi 2015, 44). A notable high-profile example of this was seen in 
2009 when the wife of Korean president Lee Myung Bak spearheaded the establishment of the 
Korean Cuisine Globalization Committee (46). The president’s wife was explicit about the 
intentions of the committee, commenting publicly that their goal was to elevate Korean cuisine 
as a globally recognizable category of food to support the continued global prosperity of the 
Hallyu brand (46). International publicity events welcoming in this new committee even utilized 
hanbok, Korean traditional clothing, to add further cultural decoration to this purpose (46). What 
this example demonstrates is the tendency of Hallyu, in part driven by government intervention, 
to suck up other cultural forms that have originally sat outside of Hallyu. Furthermore, as the 
symbolic capital of these cultural realms grows more powerful, and as they become more 
lucrative, their authority as proper Korean representations become the national template to which 
other sectors must align (45). What we get as a result is an intensifying blurriness between 
categories like K-pop, food, technology, language, and dress.  
As such, we can observe the selection of cultural activities at KIP as an expression of the 
tendency to render certain forms, practices, ideas, and images as natural expressions of Korean 
culture; expressions that help to push the global prosperity of Hallyu. Perhaps most obvious of 
this was the placement of a “K-pop dance” culture class. Indeed, many of my colleagues had 
come to Korea to study Korean language explicitly because they were interested first in K-pop 
music. And although there is arguably very little about K-pop in its form and style that is unique 
or indigenous to Korea, it has nonetheless, since the 1990s, become ubiquitous as a hallmark of 
Korean culture due to the Korean government’s harnessing of its commercial viability (Kim 
2017).  
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Part of this commercial viability, as Choi points out, is its ability to segue foreign 
audiences into other points of interest in ever expanding field of interlocking Hallyu categories 
(2015, 38). A conversation that I had with my roommate Andrew captured the dynamics of this 
arrangement quite concisely. When I asked him why he came to KIP to study, Andrew 
responded with the following: 
Ya, K-pop would play a big reason to this. Because I started listening to K-pop 
and obviously to understand Korean things…I mean not only use everything else, 
you need to know how to read Korean or listen to Korean. So I studied for a bit 
now and then I decided to just…I mean to practice to the language I usually come 
to learn (to the) original country and so I guess that’s why I’m here. To immerse 
myself in the Korean and see…because I’ve been into this [inaudible] for a while 
I will probably find something new here. 
 
As Andrew’s comments demonstrate, his point of entry into Korea and Korean language 
was indeed K-pop music. One interest segued into another as Andrew began to perceive the 
interlocking nature of each new category: in order to understand K-pop better, he needed to 
understand Korean “things.” In order to understand Korean things, he found himself needing to 
learn how to read and understand spoken Korean. During his time in Korea at KIP, Andrew 
expects that he will continue discovering yet more points of interest in a trajectory that seems to 
align perfectly with the Korean government’s objective to naturalize a growing field of Hallyu.  
Even those who came to KIP having only a minimal interest in something like K-pop, 
after having been subjected to the barrage of KIP’s culture classes, may find themselves 
broadening their interests to include other categories of Hallyu. Another one of my colleagues 
Trang, for example, a 27-year-old woman from the Netherlands, stated that her reasons for 
coming to KIP were “to study Korean and later start (her) working Holiday in Korea.” When I 
asked Trang about her relationship to K-pop, she said that she was “not a crazy fan at least, but 
K-pop has some attractive points.” “I prefer K-pop in drama or so-called OST,” she said. "I love 
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K-drama and just so you know OST is an important aspect for movie. That’s how I start listening 
to K-pop.” Then, commenting on her feelings about Korea after leaving KIP, Trang said, “I still 
love Korean cultures. Maybe even more after this KIP course. Feel no longer foreigner but more 
like local now and of course it supports my motivation to work in Korea for the next few years.” 
Similarly, the experience of my colleague Brian seemed to reflect this common tendency 
to transition seamlessly into new avenues of cultural and professional interest related to Korea. 
Brian, a 35-year-old professional from the United States, attended college in Korea, then after 
graduating in 2012, stayed for a few years to work as an English teacher. After moving back to 
the United States for a few years, Brian decided to spend the summer at KIP as a way to pursue 
his hobby of learning Korean language. Although Brian’s point of entry into Korea was not 
through K-pop, he ended up developing an interest in K-pop and dance along the way. Motivated 
by his colleagues, Brian enrolled in the K-pop dance culture class that KIP offered. By the end of 
the program when it came time for students to each give a short presentation of our experiences 
in culture class, Brian conceded that he had developed an interest in K-pop and even shared with 
everyone some of his new favorite groups – 2NE1, Big Bang, and SHINee.  
Both Trang’s and Brian’s experiences show how the many points of interest related to 
Korea all seem to feed one another. Based on what Trang told me, her interest in Korea first 
began with drama OSTs, or “original soundtracks.”2 As Trang mentions, K-pop groups 
sometimes even provide the music for the OSTs themselves, making this transitional discovery 
process all the more seamless. Subsequently, Trang’s hobby interests led to her professional 
interest in Korea which as we know simultaneously necessitated her acquisition of Korean 
language. Likewise, although Brian’s entry point into Korea was initially educational, and later 
                                                        
2 Dramas are often considered the original driving force of the first wave of Korean cultural exports in the 1990s, 
which pioneered the terrain for K-pop (Choi, 2015; Oh, 2015; Yong, 2016). 
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professional, these interests eventually led him to return to Korea to pursue another related 
interest: language. Then, through the strategic placement of language alongside other categories 
of Hallyu, Brian was eventually turned on to K-pop. From Brian’s trajectory we can note the 
ways in which Korea as a site of educational interest, flowed organically into Korea as a 
professional interest. Both of these points of interest then fed into KIP, which then exposed Brian 
to yet another Korean cultural interest, thus successfully fostering the co-prosperity between all 
of these interest points.  
2.3 Miracle on the Han 
 Two of our culture classes – our trip to the Korean War Memorial museum, and our trip 
Seodaemun Prison – were expressly concerned with providing students with particular historical 
narratives. Although I do not see these two field trips as necessarily representing two intentioned 
categories of Hallyu, the historical narratives they provided to students I do believe are 
expressions of a dominant order of knowledge that legitimizes and praises the South Korean 
nation, which thereby enhances Hallyu as a unique category of cultural products.  
 When we arrived at the Korean War Memorial museum, my class was provided with an 
in-house tour guide, pre-arranged by KIP, who showed us all the exhibits and explained to us 
their meanings and significances. The content and structure of the exhibits were set up in a way 
that highlighted particular details of the Korean War and represented the parties involved in 
specific ways. Throughout our tour, I took note of the places in the museum where the tour guide 
stopped us, which details he emphasized, and which images he pointed to. 
 Several times during our tour, I noted how our guide seemed to imply an unfairness 
inherent in the conditions of the Korean War. At one point he stopped to show us some statistics. 
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Look at this number. At the beginning of the Korean War, Soviet Union provided 
North Korea more than 200 tanks and more than 200 [inaudible] aircraft. South 
Korean leader [inaudible] we had only 22 light aircraft. Toy! Toy! 
 
In a different room, our guide stopped to show us an exhibit that displayed a particular 
battle of the Korean War. 
Look at this map. Only one month later, war outbreak. The situation on this map. 
We lost almost our nation. So the United Nations and South Korean soldiers have 
to fight with convictions or die. And that day, 29 deployed from the Guam island, 
a lot of ammunitions on this area. We call it “carpet bombing.” 5 kilometers wide 
and 12 kilometers long. From the 100 feet, 29 bomber dropped a bomb on that 
area. So they…we kept up this line, 45 days. During that time General MacArthur 
prepared the Incheon operation. 
 
As we approached the exhibits that represented the chronological end of the war, our 
guide gave us one more anecdote before leading us into the next room. 
So look in front of us. North Korea killed the innocent people. And when they 
escaped from the captured city, they kidnapped more than 100 thousand scientists, 
artists, and scholars. Why they selected the scholars, scientists, artists? As you 
know, just after the liberation from Japan from 1945 to 1948 when we established 
the government, the movement between south and north was free. So at that time, 
most of the scholars, scientists, artists, in North Korea moved to the south for 
freedom and peace.   
 
 Then pointing to one last placard of war statistics, our guide left us with a rhetorical 
question. 
At that time just before the war broke out, population of North Korea 10 million. 
On the other hand, South Korea 20 million population. Two times more than 
North Korea. Can you imagine why they moved to the south?  
 
The specific elements emphasized by the exhibits in the Korean War Memorial museum 
and that were interpreted to us by our tour guide are reflective of a nationalist narrative that 
hinges on the savagery and illegitimacy of the (communist) North, and the innocence and unique 
steadfast character of the (capitalist) South. In the aftermath of the Korean War, while the 
government of the North was able to quickly and effectively establish a national ideology to 
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command its people, the government of the South did not have a clear national ideology at first 
(Kim 2017, 1-2). In order to swiftly command hegemony over this first republic of South Korea, 
President Syngman Rhee worked toward constructing a national identity that was predicated on 
anti-communism. By seizing the press, utilizing the institution of primary education, and 
constructing a National Police, Rhee sought to physically and ideologically weed out communist 
sentiment and create an overall red-scare political climate (Robinson 2007; Kim 2017). Although 
the 1960s brought changes in the structure of government in South Korea to cull some of these 
presidential powers exhibited by Rhee, this trend of anti-communist Cold War authoritarianism 
endured in later regimes. Under the leadership of Park Chung Hee for example, president Park 
brought rapid economic growth to South Korea during the 1960s and 1970s under a similar anti-
communist authoritarianism; a political and economic climate that set the stage for Korea’s 
continued economic expansion into the 1990s and 2000s (Robinson 2007, 129). This expansion, 
which was sparked by Park’s export-led economic plan, and that brought South Korea from 
being one of the poorest countries in the world to one of the most formidable world exporters, 
became coined by observers and nationalists alike as the “Miracle on the Han”3 (129-130). 
This “Miracle on the Han” myth, which was explicitly alluded to during our tour, along 
with the other elements highlighted by our guide, can be seen as expressions of a brand of 
nationalism that praises the national character of South Korea as resilient and culturally unique. 
As shown in the transcripts above, several stops of our tour were made to highlight the South’s 
“zero to hero” redemption story. According to our guide, the South was able to endure even the 
most disheartening odds, “fighting with conviction” despite their lack of resources – equipped 
                                                        
3 “Han” in this phrase refers to the Han River – a major river that runs through the capital city Seoul.  
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with mere “toys” – and the presence of a cruel and ruthless enemy who engaged in intense carpet 
bombing.  
Then, by provoking our group with the image of the artists, scientists, and scholars, 
whom fled from north to south, we were encouraged to contemplate not only the excellence of 
South Korean freedom and democracy, but also the exceptionality of its base of personnel. In our 
guide’s story of the conclusion of the Korean War, it is implied that all of Korea’s “best” – 
artists, scientists, and scholars – exited North Korea and became the foundation of South Korea’s 
intellectual and creative workforce, painting the South as talented and free, and the North as 
devoid of creativity and undesirable. Although not explicitly implicating Hallyu or Korean 
cultural products, these constituting narratives – of the “Miracle on the Han” and of the South as 
a bastion of creativity and innovation – contribute to an overall understanding of South Korea as 
a brand to be desired. KIP and the Korean War Memorial are, as Althusser (2001) might suggest, 
“relatively autonomous” institutions, yet are unified by their embeddedness in “the ruling 
ideology” (100). Whether appealing to internal nationalist sentiment, to outsiders considering 
conducting business in Korea, or other foreigners seeking Korean cultural products, the “Miracle 
on the Han” myth espoused by our tour guide contributes to the overall prosperity of Korea and 
Korean cultural products, including language training.  
2.4 Stuff They Want 
Antonio Gramsci argues that “intellectuals,” whose function is to elaborate the conditions 
favorable to their respective social group and that group’s mode of production, are also 
legitimized through the instrument of school (1971, 8-13). However, not only by schools and 
intellectuals, the entire “world of production” is “‘mediated’ by the whole fabric of society and 
by the complex of superstructures, of which the intellectuals are, precisely, the ‘functionaries’” 
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(12). Thus, we should take seriously KIP’s ability to elaborate its own interests (i.e. selling 
Korean language) by disseminating the information that legitimizes the current mode of 
production upon which KIP also relies (i.e. privileging certain things and activities as authentic 
Korean culture and privileging particular narratives as granted). But we should also keep in mind 
that the information privileged throughout KIP is not necessarily manufactured by KIP itself. 
Rather, KIP is merely a “functionary”; a mediator through which this information, already 
naturalized throughout an entire “world of production,” is rapidly deployed (12).  
For instance, when I asked my culture teacher, Sung Min, how cultural activities were 
chosen, he replied by saying that they were selected personally by him based on what he thought 
foreign students might find interesting and on what he felt to be accurate representations of 
Korean culture. But, after attending each culture class, it was also clear that our activities, for the 
most part, were already a part of an established repertoire. That is, many of our culture activities 
were deployed by tourist-oriented businesses hired by KIP. These activities seemed to come 
neatly-packaged, ready to be streamlined to small or large tour groups in two-hour sessions. 
After our classes, I would linger around, waiting for the rest of my classmates to shuffle out so 
that I could secure an interview with whomever was leading the class that day. On several 
occasions, such as after our stamp-making class, I noticed the teacher-for-hire whip out her 
portable credit card machine, whereupon Sung Min produced payment for our day’s session. In 
other instances, such as when we met for cooking class and for our traditional book-making 
class, the place of instruction was in a store front of a business which faced high foot traffic areas 
in popular tourist areas. Likewise, the activities which took place on campus were merely 
extended demonstrations by departments already existing within the university – for example the 
p’ungmulp’ae club (traditional Korean drums).  
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 Sung Min thus chose our cultural activities, but he did so from a cache of pre-existing 
forms that made the choice mostly obvious. Although Sung Min commands a degree of authority 
in disseminating Korean culture; representations that I have continued to argue reap benefits for 
KIP, since “(t)he relationship between the intellectuals and the world of production is not as 
direct as it is with the fundamental social groups” (Gramsci 1971, 12), Sung Min is not 
elaborating the interests of a nation, state, or class directly. Rather, Sung Min’s choice of Korean 
cultural activities might be thought of as the “natural” choice within a hegemonic and well-
established repertoire.  
 But whereas Sung Min’s selective process demonstrates KIP’s role as a mediator of a 
repertoire of lucrative cultural forms, the program director’s comments regarding the selection of 
field trip activities captures another side of this relationship: the “wants” of the masses. By 
Adorno’s figuring, the present mode of production is not mediated only by the innovation of the 
handicraft, but also by the audiences who are seeking fun and distraction. Thus “promoters of 
commercialized entertainment exonerate themselves by referring to the fact that they are giving 
the masses what they want” (Adorno 1998, 205). The program director of KIP likewise seemed 
to echo this exact sentiment. Yet this narrative, Adorno warns, is still not innocent. The logic 
encased in this exoneration “is an ideology appropriate to commercial purposes: the less the mass 
discriminates, the greater the possibility of selling cultural commodities indiscriminately” (205). 
Although we can indeed note the formidable power of these commercial purposes as noted by 
the influence of government and industry, we should regard leisure activities as yet another field 
of contestation.  
The divided attention I was expected to give to culture classes certainly made me 
question the intentions of KIP at times. “They just try to sell you K-pop” my friend Jeff, a local 
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university teacher in Seoul, told me, perhaps a bit too late. “They have a great language 
department, just not in the summer.” Jeff explained to me that Sogang also held language courses 
during the regular school year, and that the teaching staff were excellent. As such, Jeff suggested 
the best thing to do would be to explain my situation to them and see about transferring into 
another class. During the second week of instruction, I approached the program director in the 
classroom halls. I expressed to her that I was feeling dissatisfied with the way cultural classes 
were going since they facilitated very little speaking practice. Trying to reach a solution to my 
dilemma, I requested to substitute culture classes for perhaps another language course being held 
somewhere else on campus. Quite defensively, she denied my request and suggested that I 
instead take advantage of the TAs and course instructors by practicing my speaking skills with 
them during class time. So, on our field trip to a Korean professional league baseball game, an 
activity organized by the program director herself, I did just that.  
As all the KIP students filed into the stadium and took their seats in the bleachers, I found 
a seat next to the director. On and off throughout the duration of the game, I made attempts to 
strike up conversations with her. Not particularly thrilled at the prospect of talking to me for the 
entire game, she nonetheless conceded to my questions intermittently, albeit somewhat 
standoffishly. When I asked her how field trips were selected, she became a bit defensive, 
perhaps presuming that there was a criticism undergirding my question. “We ask the foreigners 
what they want to do,” she justified with a tint of defense in her voice. She explained that every 
year, students are surveyed about which things they would like to do or see in Korea, and KIP 
tries to arrange those things. As mentioned, these requested things amounted into field trips to a 
baseball game, an amusement park, NANTA (a musical comedy show), and a K-pop 
performance.  
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The director’s denial of my request to transfer classes, I believe is further demonstrative 
of KIP as a contested arena between language and culture. But more specifically, our 
conversation at the baseball game reveals the tension between what Adorno calls “an ideology 
appropriate to commercial purposes” and the “stuff” that audiences “want.” Granted, there was 
no way for me to know if any other substitute class would actually have accommodated my 
schedule, nor should I necessarily expect that the director is obligated to bend the program rules 
to accommodate me. Nonetheless, the director’s reluctance to talk to me, even at her own 
suggestion, shows an unconcern for the quality of language instruction, namely at the indulgence 
of cultural activities and cultural field trips. Although Sogang University, as per Jeff’s comment, 
has a reputation first and foremost as providing quality language instruction, the director’s 
response to my dilemma, both in her comments and in her actions, makes clear that there is a 
threshold governing how much language instruction can be tolerated. By trying to make 
advances into the times designated for cultural activities – the two-hour cultural activity time 
block and the cultural field trip – I was made aware of the boundaries past which language was 
not permitted to advance.  
Then, in the director’s defensive posturing, we are able to see what Adorno argues is an 
attempt to exonerate oneself from the more discrete intentions of giving audiences the “stuff” the 
“want”: that is, selling cultural commodities indiscriminately. Adorno sees the “notion of 
distraction” as an inseparable element from the mode of production – masses, in order to attain 
the respite they need to continue contributing their labor power to production, seek leisure time 
and/or distraction (1998, 205). 
Adorno’s shining example of a leisure activity – popular music – indeed appeared as one 
of our field trips. The K-pop concert, since it was a semi-exclusive dress rehearsal performance, 
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had a limited number of spots open to students. On the day sign-ups were made available to KIP 
students, I showed up to the 11th floor of the KIP office only to discover that a long line of 
students had already been formed. I ultimately decided against waiting in line, opting instead to 
let the true K-pop enthusiasts take my place. Regardless, it was clear that many students in the 
program were eager to attend and had arrived early to secure their spot.  
The other cultural activities requested by students, though not popular music, were by 
Adorno’s definition certainly analogous. An amusement park and a sporting event – things that 
many foreigners would likely be familiar with in their home countries – to be sure, were given 
extra “cultural” inflection. The paper handout that was compiled for us by KIP for our baseball 
field trip for example read: “While baseball may not be a traditional Korean sport, it is a great 
example of REAL KOREAN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE!” (emphasis theirs). Leisure 
activities like these that were “standard” enough to be accessible to most foreign students were 
made all the more commodifiable by demanding their authenticity; a move of self-assertion that 
others have noted is common among ethnic and national communities whom seek legitimation 
through the containment and insertion of an authentic cultural character into market relations 
(Taylor 1993; Comaroff 2009; Dávilla 2012). These not-so-uncommon leisure activities are 
made more commercially viable precisely because they are branded as representing something 
authentically Korean.  
The smattering of leisure entertainment throughout the weeks of our program make more 
sense also when we consider the seasonal placement of KIP: early summer. Just as my friend Jeff 
brought to stark realization, the regular school year, by his figuring, is more strictly focused on 
quality language instruction, whereas the summer program is trying to “sell you K-pop.” The 
summer certainly seems to play into the leisure time of foreign audiences, catching those out of 
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school for the summer or those enjoying their summer work vacation days. My dormitory 
roommates where two such examples of this, as was I. It was no wonder then why foreigners 
chose leisure activities like baseball games and amusement parks for the types of field trips they 
wished to do.  
And although we don’t know the precise innerworkings of Sogang and their KLEC in 
regard to how summer versus winter courses are devised bureaucratically – whether teachers 
themselves might be unmotivated to teach during their own potential vacation period and/or 
whether culture classes have merely become something to fill the gap in an understaffed, ill-
conceived program – I have interpreted KIPs nominal distinction between language and culture 
as proof of, at the very least, a practical distinction. For as Marxist theorist Louis Althusser 
suggests, even though there might be ideological disunity amongst the various ideological state 
apparatuses (i.e. schools, churches, media, etc.), they are unified nonetheless by their 
subordination to the dominant ideology (2001, 100). KIP’s mere recognition of “culture” as 
something that could exist apart from “language,” would not only suggest that such a recognition 
is already a possible choice to make within the dominant ideological framework, but would also, 
whether accompanied by ideological investment or not, as I have continued to show, be a 
“natural,” lucrative, and accessible choice to make. The repertoire of Korean cultural activities 
that pervade the tourism circuit, KIP’s brochure that declares baseball as “REAL KOREAN 
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE,” and the “Miracle on the Han” narrative that seems to declare a 
unique South Korean essence, all seem to suggest that “Korean culture” has already become 
something alienable and salient.  
2.5 Communicating Hallyu 
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The importance of the information contained in our culture classes to the continued 
prosperity of Hallyu was also made clear by our instructors’ frequent reversions to English. 
Although our KIP program brochure assured that cultural activities were meant to “help 
(students) practice their Korean language skills in a real world setting” (Sogang University 
2018), this idea was wishful thinking at best. For a number of compounded reasons, the priority 
to uphold our Korean language contracts throughout the program, especially in culture class, 
seemed to fall to the wayside. And although there were a variety of identifiable factors 
contributing to this failure, each reason ultimately seems to point to an unspoken understanding 
that indispensable to our activities and program more generally was for students to understand 
the “culture” that was being taught, and that this “culture” could be digested apart from 
“language.”  
One major impediment to the consistency in Korean language instruction was that each 
culture class was taught by a different instructor. In a few instances, for example in our 
traditional instrument, mask dance, and traditional scarf dance classes, instruction was relegated 
to instructors from other departments on campus. When I learned how to play the pok, a 
traditional Korean drum, I joined a class led by the students from the campus music club. 
Likewise, when we learned a traditional Korean scarf dance, we were taught by an instructor 
from the dance department. However, most of our classes were not affiliated with Sogang at all, 
but were independent professionals or institutions hired by KIP to lead us in an activity. 
Sometimes, as in the case of the Korean War Memorial, these were public museums where a 
guide was hired to provide us with a personal tour. For other activities such as the stamp making, 
booking making, and cooking classes, our class was held at a private studio or store front.  
 42 
Because there was no particular cohesive relation or line of communication between all 
of our culture instructors, there was a clear lack of pedagogical consistency throughout. Some 
instructors, assuming that our class was merely a group of tourists, spoke English to us right 
away. Others, after becoming frustrated with our varying levels of Korean comprehension, also 
eventually reverted to English. For some classes, like our museum tours, English tour guides 
were selected specifically so that students could more easily follow along on worksheets 
provided to us by KIP.  
As a result of this inconsistent instruction, students eventually became comfortable using 
English themselves, both to speak to instructors and to talk amongst themselves. Hailing from a 
range of national and linguistic backgrounds, students found it easier in many cases to speak to 
each other in English – a language that most had a stronger command over than Korean. As 
students became more acquainted with one another and excited by each other’s company, in-
between-class chat became more frequent. Before our teachers entered the classroom or during 
pauses in instruction – even during our language classes – the room would be full of English side 
conversations. As students tested the limits of how far we could push our language contracts, 
instructors sometimes also conceded. By our third and fourth weeks of instruction, the contracts 
that we had signed on the first day of class seemed to have faded from our memories. The 
general bonhomie of the program, combined with inconsistent instruction, overpowered the 
seriousness of upholding the integrity of our contracts.   
  The inconsistency in Korean language instruction is, I believe, once again demonstrative 
of the compromise KIP has made in the face of an ideological and economic climate that upholds 
the celebration of Hallyu to be of absolute consequence. KIP’s decision to hire outside 
instructors whom are likely unaware of, or unconcerned with, our language contracts and/or the 
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pedagogical purpose of culture classes as stated on your program brochure, is an indication that 
KIP has deemed this “cultural” component to our education of considerable importance. 
Students’ complete comprehension of the specific information contained in such classes as our 
Korean War Memorial tour was also proven to outweigh the importance of maintaining Korean 
language instruction. Furthermore, in classes like cooking and dancing, less important did the 
instructors find in maintaining Korean instruction than they did in making sure that students were 
enjoying their cultural experience; a dynamic that ultimately works to the advantage of KIP by 
ensuring favorable impressions of Korean culture broadly.  
2.6 Participating in Hallyu 
 On the one hand, as Adorno would suggest, we could argue that my evidence points to 
the fact that KIP has clearly facilitated a path that allows them to sell cultural products to foreign 
audiences more easily. That is, the program clearly surveys foreigners about what “stuff” they 
“want” in a way that funnels their answers towards choosing leisure activities – setting up the 
entire program during a peak summer vacation season, and then scheduling the activities on the 
weekends. Then, by emphasizing the “Koreanness” of these activities, KIP does double work by 
ensuring that students are both refreshed enough to consume more cultural activities during the 
week and by adding them to the repertoire of “real Korean contemporary culture.”  
 Yet, on the other hand, as I have continued to argue, Adorno’s model, though helpful in 
understanding the formidable socioeconomic forces involved in the generation of Korean 
cultural products, and likewise, the generation of representations of Korea, problematically 
paints this arrangement as a zero-sum game. We should first keep in mind that this 
socioeconomic arrangement between foreign consumers and Korean cultural products, due to its 
situatedness within a global context where cultural interactions are becoming all the more fluid, 
 44 
Adorno’s framework, and the Marxist framework upon which Adorno’s relies, are prone to what 
Appadurai (1996) calls “disjuncture,” or unpredictability (35). And, more central to my purpose 
here, we should recognize this arrangement as an ongoing contestation for the power to define; to 
define what might count as culture, to define what relationship there should be between 
something called “culture” and something called “language,” and also to define the terms of 
one’s participation in the mode of production. I see the consumer as not merely at the receiving 
end of products wholly spelled out for them already, nor do I see their “wants” as wholly 
predetermined. Rather, consumers should actually, according to Choi, be considered “craftsmen” 
(2015, 41). That is, “the Hallyu culture has been shaped and altered by fans themselves” 
(emphasis author’s) (43). Even the reversions to English by instructors could be read, as Gal 
(1987) would suggest, as an indication of our instructors’ “historic position and identity within 
regional economic systems structured around dependency and unequal development”; economic 
systems that rely on the recognition and validation of foreign, namely English-speaking, 
audiences (637). Using English thus allows instructors to harness this power of a global audience 
(Hill 1999, 542). 
 Based on ethnographic interviews that I collected from a few of my colleagues at KIP, 
and on the general observations that I made throughout the program, it became clear that KIP 
students, though they were certainly attracted to specific textual aspects of Hallyu, they also, to 
an extent, took control of their own Hallyu experience. My roommate Andrew explained to me 
some of his own points of attraction to K-pop, and also, explained some of the innerworkings of 
K-pop fandom. In a conversation we had about some of the other genres of pop music that 
segued him into K-pop, Andrew said something profound about the demands of fans.  
Andrew: I think what K-pop differs itself is really the performance. Because you   
can see that a lot of Chinese pop, Japanese pop, has started to go to the dance 
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route, that involve all the choreography in their performance. But K-pop in 
general just appear more synchronized and better well thought. And there’s this 
sentence like that I came across when I was watching this new show that they had 
this Japanese trainee and Korean trainee. So, the trainee themselves for Korea, 
“we are,” how you say, “we are trained to perform.”  
 
Corey: Trained to perform…Ok ya.  
 
Andrew: Ya so like you have to be good in singing, good in dancing, everything 
and synchronized. But Japanese, the trainees themselves say that “we are trained 
to entertain.” 
 
Corey: What’s the difference to you?  
 
Andrew: So it’s something like, “I don’t need to perform very well as long as you 
like me and you’re happy.” That’s Japanese. 
 
Corey: That’s Japanese? 
 
Andrew: Yes. 
 
Corey: And so then what’s performance? 
 
Andrew: Its like…your…how do you say? Your performance must be good. You 
should sing well, you should dance well, you shouldn’t make any mistake. For 
Japanese I guess that’s fine.  
 
Corey: And so you value that? 
 
Andrew: I mean if to entertain you need to be on the stage. You can just be an 
artist like a model. I will still like you. But if you are performing, of course I will 
expect the performance to be good. 
 
 Andrew expresses something perhaps not uncommon among fans of K-pop, which is that, 
for fans, K-pop means more than just good singing – it has to do with the quality of an overall 
performance that includes dancing and synchronicity (Lee 2015; Yoon 2017). However, what is 
revealing in Andrew’s explanation is the discriminatory nature of his preferences: he expects 
perfection. Although Andrew seems to think other types of pop music like Japanese pop are fine 
for what they are, he is not satisfied with what he deems as merely “entertainment.” Instead, 
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Andrew weighs the different qualities of Japanese pop and K-pop and makes a choice based on 
the qualities he values.  
 Later in our conversation, Andrew makes further distinction about what he sees as the 
difference between K-pop and other types of pop music.  
If we are talking about K-pop, actually it’s the whole package I would say. Ya the 
song, the song of course is definitely important but K-pop performance including 
the dance in general is attractive in a sense. And another thing that draws people 
to go into K-pop artists is because of the personality. Because they sort of branded 
the whole artist appearance and stuff to make you… something like you have (to) 
fall into this person and you know about them so the next time they release a new 
song you would be interested to know what the next song is. Otherwise I wouldn’t 
care like, unless your song is really really good, otherwise I wouldn’t care who 
are you. 
 
 Again, Andrew makes it clear that K-pop fans are not merely passive consumers, but that 
they take into account the multiple talents of the artists – what he calls the “whole package.” 
Although Andrew does mention branding, a distinction that would imply the artificial crafting of 
artists by entertainment companies, he also continues to express the discerning processes of fans. 
Implied by Andrew is that if at some point a fan does not feel that they know enough about an 
artist, that their personality is not attractive enough, or that their song is not “really really good,” 
then fans are prone not to care. Further, Andrew also brings up another qualitative dimension of 
K-pop – that of “personality.”    
I guess because we are international fans right, so we don’t interact with artists so 
its mostly through variety shows, and also their own show – their own video 
content. Especially now in Korea now there is V live. So a lot of artist go to V live 
just like other Koreans how they video cam themselves, and then they talk to the 
camera. That’s how I guess international fans relate to them. They read your 
comments. Ya the comments are real life so they can actually read, of course the 
comments are really fast, so if you’re lucky enough they spot a comment and just 
answer a question. That’s the live portion. But other than variety, like when you 
see them on to other variety shows then you feel like you understand this person 
more, this person is interesting. Korean call these people “artists.” There is one 
show that say that an artist and a singer are different. Singer just sing. You just 
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release album, people listen to your song. But artist is a whole package. They like 
about you, your dance, your personality.  
 
As Andrew explains more about the dynamics of the fan/idol relationship, we see that 
artists respond to fans in ways that seem to meet the needs of fans beyond providing them with 
mere entertainment. Certainly, some have asserted that nearly every single element of K-pop, 
including fan outreach by artists, is carefully engineered to extract maximum profit from fans 
(Kim, 2011; Galbraith and Karlin, 2012; Kim, 2017). Much in the same way that I have 
suggested that we think of “language” and “culture” as abstracted categories whose discursive 
distinctions frame consumption practices in a particular way, the variety shows that Andrew and 
other fans watch seem to also frame how K-pop ought to be evaluated.  
Regardless, we should keep in mind that “where there is consumption there is pleasure, 
and where there is pleasure there is agency (Appadurai 1996, 7). Whether the distinction between 
“artist” and “performer” has been perpetuated by the industry itself, or whether it has developed 
more organically based on how artists have chosen to present themselves (Dávila 2001, 2-3) and 
likewise on what fans have demanded, is again, I suggest, an issue better understood as a 
contestation. As others have demonstrated, the affective dynamic of K-pop fandom and the 
unique ways that fans interface with idols and each other has made fandom a potentially 
formidable force in making waves in industry standards (Choi 2015; Lee, 2015; Maliangkay, 
2015; Oh, 2015; Yoon, 2017). V live, a mobile app that allows fans to enter into live streams with 
their favorite idols and celebrities, as Andrew points out, is a way for foreign audiences to 
maintain the interpersonal and affective attachments that fans feel for their favorite idols. This 
app, which is specifically geared towards international fans, is a prime example of what Choi 
argues is a way for “the fan (to be) a vital force interior to the workings of Hallyu as a cultural 
process, though exterior to the productive site of Hallyu content both geographically and 
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physically” (emphasis author’s) (2015, 42). The unique nature of being an international fan – 
being geographically distant from Korea, and thus feeling emotionally distant from idols – has 
come to influence and shape the very structure and content of Hallyu. As demonstrated by the 
live Q&A sessions that Andrew mentions, international fans are able to provide feedback to 
artists in real time, via a format shaped by the particular needs of international fans, to which 
artists try to respond also in real time.  
 Furthermore, as the above example of V Live demonstrates, and as Choi emphasizes, 
“Korea is not in possession of Hallyu” (2015, 41). Although it may be tempting to dismiss the 
Hallyu phenomenon, and the ever-expanding array of Korean cultural products that Hallyu is 
growing to include, as entirely the result of corporate calculations as Adorno might suggest, it is 
also important to recognize that the fans of Hallyu are not homogenous. As shown by the 
demographic makeup of my KIP cohort – a cohort that included individuals from Russia, 
Malaysia, Canada, the U.K., Australia, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Germany, the U.S., Italy, 
Turkey, and the Netherlands – enthusiasts for K-pop and Korean culture are from diverse 
national, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds. As such, these international fans are subject to 
receiving and interacting with Hallyu in divergent ways, thus constantly negotiating its forms 
and meanings. And, just as Benjamin reminds us that mass reproduction can free art from its 
ritual origin, so too can we think of the 35 million consumers of Hallyu worldwide as freeing 
Hallyu production from a single ritualized arrangement.  
 By the time KIP 2018 was coming to end, I was able to assess with some hindsight how 
my colleagues were negotiating their own Korean experience all along. As I mentioned at the 
beginning of this section, I was cognizant throughout my time at KIP that my purpose for 
coming to Korea diverged in some ways from my colleagues. Often there were times when I felt 
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that my commitment to strictly adhering to our language contracts made me a bit of an outsider. 
Whereas I was interested in extracting the most academic value I could from my time at KIP, my 
colleagues preferred to speak in English with one another. During culture classes, at field trip 
outings, and all times in between, it was clear that speaking Korean was not necessarily a part of 
their Korean experience. Though it was fun for students to engage in small talk in between class 
about peoples’ favorite idols and which Korean actors people found most attractive, most did not 
feel the need to do so in Korean. Nonetheless, they continued to explore Korea together in their 
own way. My colleagues communicated in a group chat via KakaoTalk, a Korean SMS app, 
about their plans to go to the noraebang (Korean Karaoke bar), famous shopping districts, or 
barbeque restaurants over the weekend. Students, it seemed, found much more enjoyment from 
Korea and KIP activities in their ability to share their experiences with one another in the ways 
that were comfortable for them. That is, students seemed to find solidarity in their shared 
experience as outsiders.  
 And although this sort of outsider experience – vacationing in Korea over the summer, 
haphazardly touring through a plethora of “cultural activities” and “cultural field trips” with 
other foreigners like oneself, while remaining safe and comfortable within one’s own linguistic 
cohort – may still seem to reinforce Adorno’s cynicism that these consumers are merely looking 
for fun (and to a large extent they were), we must also recognize that this new meaning and way 
of interfacing with Korea in turn influences the way these activities are presented to us. That is, 
the flow of media and ideas, precisely because they are differently available to different global 
actors, are subject to situational possibilities and constraints (Appadurai 1996, 34-35); the work 
of art becomes reproduced with the audience in mind (Benjamin 1969, 11). 
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Choi argues that through a process of “creative cultural participation” such as this, 
Hallyu, and the extended sphere of things labeled as “Korean culture” that were presented to us 
at Sogang, are not merely “received and consumed,” but rather are “handled and reprocessed” by 
the fans themselves (2015, 44). This “act of caring and engaging these products,” Choi argues, 
is generative of the cultural climates under which the next stage production of 
Hallyu content is envisioned and conditioned, if not determined. Hence, the 
myopic and monistic view of production, products and producers has to be 
renegotiated, or better yet, replaced with a multifocal perspective Hallyu as a fluid 
cultural ecology in which nominal distinctions across producers, distributors, and 
users of Hallyu content dissolve into a larger system of creative cultural 
participation. (emphasis author’s) (Choi 2015, 44) 
 
Choi, in this tone that seems to explicitly warn against Adorno’s cynicism, helps us make 
sense of my and my colleagues’ experiences at Sogang as a process of participation rather than a 
process of repression. Not unlike Garofalo’s idea of a contested space, Choi would see the many 
actors involved in our KIP experience – the director, the teachers, the students, and all of the 
culture class instructors – as participants in a process whose end result is a negotiated 
representation of Korea and “Korean culture.”  
2.7 To Make a Dream Circle 
The original intention of this thesis, inspired by my fascination with what I have 
considered for the better part of my life to be “underground” and “subcultural” music genres, 
was to put Adorno’s concepts of popular and serious music to the test in order to find what, if 
any, potential music and art actually have in challenging a dominant hegemon. I had planned on 
doing this through a comparison of K-pop – a nominally “popular” type of music – with hardcore 
– a nominally “serious,” “fringe,” or “niche” type of music. Much in the same way as I have 
described above, and as demonstrated by the stories of my colleagues, my interest in Korea 
began through a narrow entry point and has since blossomed into much more. After earning my 
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undergraduate degree, I set out to find a job teaching English as a foreign language. After 
applying unsuccessfully for a job in Japan, I was recommended to try applying for a job in 
Korea. I did eventually find a job in Korea, and despite Korea being a place I knew very little 
about at the time, I ended up staying for three years. Already having a considerable interest in 
underground hardcore music, I quickly fell into the thriving hardcore scenes in Seoul and Busan. 
Then, motivated to be able to speak fluently in Korean with my friends, I began studying Korean 
language in my free time. With the significant amount of time I had spent in Korea participating 
in its fringe music scene, I focused my experiences into my current academic interests. Just as 
Choi has described, and as I have demonstrated throughout this thesis via my KIP colleagues, I 
too had wondered rather seamlessly from interest to interest. Each transition was made possible 
by my recognition of the Korean brand and inevitably guided me to a career choice that might 
one day implicate me in enhancing that brand.  
However, after spending a summer in Korea now with “the spy-glass of Anthropology to 
look through,” as Zora Neale Hurston so eloquently coined it (1990, 3), I found the most striking 
expression of subculture in a place that I did not expect to. I had collected data from my 
interlocutors in the Korean hardcore scene in search for subculture, but the most fascinating 
individual that I met over the summer, and the most pertinent to this conversation I believe, was 
lurking within the interior of KIP itself. Her name was Lucia. Lucia, a 51-year-old Korean 
woman, was hired by KIP to teach our traditional Korean calligraphy culture class. Lucia’s class 
was certainly a student favorite. With short, salt and pepper hair, thick rimmed black glasses, and 
a loose-fitting white smock that seemed to perfectly accommodate her flowy movements, Lucia 
captivated students as she flamboyantly bounced around the classroom barefoot, tearing off huge 
slabs of butcher paper from a roll, placing them in the middle of the room and painting on them 
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elegant hangeul letters with black ink. Lucia would demonstrate a pattern or particular brush 
stroke, and students would follow along. After each pattern we practiced in this way, Lucia, with 
playful abandon, prompted us to crumble up our papers into balls and throw them to the center of 
the classroom, to which students confusedly complied. Her style was mad yet balanced, frenzied 
yet calculated, chaotic yet orderly. To observe Lucia performing her art was inspiring to say the 
least.  
After class I sat down with Lucia to have a few words. Using my best Korean language 
skills, I began asking Lucia my standard questions that I had prepared in the form of a 
questionnaire. “What is your age and occupation?” “What do you call what you do?” “What does 
your brush mean to you?” After politely responding to some of my questions in Korean, Lucia 
peeked ahead on my list of questions and noticed the phrase “underground music.” Seeing a 
topic that caught her interest, Lucia co-opted the interview and began asking me questions, 
including asking me why I was interested in her if my questions are about music. I told her I was 
interested in artists in general, creativity, and why hardcore musicians come together to make 
music despite earning no money, at which point Lucia chimed in in English.  
Lucia: This is I’m not sure, but I have an answer. Because I went to many place. I 
went to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Osaka, Brisbane, Indonesia. Actually, calligraphy is 
really important for me. Really same question. So, I really want to draw the 
calligraphy, I want to meet many person.  
 
Corey: And you can communicate with other people doing calligraphy maybe? 
 
Lucia: Of course. But the other person say, “Lucia, this is not commercial. This is 
not earn the money. It’s difficult for you.” Of course, I know. But my life want 
get just to meet a person. And I want to make happiness through the calligraphy. 
So sometimes my mind is sad. Sometimes really disappointed by myself because 
artist really difficult make a money and earn the money. So I’m…today I 
introduced my work (in class). Very famous  soju brand, (to which the students 
responded,) “Oh Lucia rich!” But I’m not rich. Just a really poor artist. But my 
mind is really happy. And I’m satisfied with my life. Sometimes really difficult. 
But many time I went to the other place, I make many performance. Last year I 
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went to Taiwan. Just, I make a “Meet Lucia Festival” in Taiwan. The others say, 
“Lucia, wow Lucia you make a Taiwan festival!” My idea is, I meet just one 
person, we can make a festival.  
 
Lucia, and the images she produces, like the people and images that appeared in our other 
culture classes, are co-opted by KIP and other institutions, and subsumed into to an ever-growing 
repertoire of things, people, and media that become constituted as authentic Korean culture. 
However, of particular note in Lucia’s situation, is that Lucia remains, to a degree, marginalized 
in this arrangement. As Lucia alluded to in our interview, she had even been hired by a popular 
Korean soju company, Ch’ohŭn Dei Soju (GoodDay Soju), to design their bottle label. Carried 
far and wide on the label of this soju bottle, Lucia’s calligraphy can be seen on advertisements 
nationwide and on supermarket shelves of foreign countries, the latter of which offers many 
onlookers their first glimpse of what “Korean culture” looks like, and the former offering 
cultural instructions of gendered propriety (Harkness 2013). Students were surprised to see that 
the iconized Korean text that appeared on the widely recognizable soju brand was designed by 
her. Part of this surprise, as Lucia points out, is that students expected Lucia to be “rich” as a 
result of such mainstream success. To be sure, Lucia’s art has become naturalized as a 
quintessential iconographic representation of Korea, which as subsequently made her the target 
of appropriation by other institutions like KIP. Yet, Lucia feels herself to be “just a really poor 
artist” struggling to make ends meet.  
But, what I find most admirable about Lucia – that which is most pertinent to this thesis – 
is her ability to find meaning within this inflexible arrangement despite her marginalization. It is 
precisely Lucia’s marginalization that I believe sets her apart from popular culture as described 
by Adorno. Whereas Sogang University, as an example, has compromised the integrity of its 
language instruction by committing a large portion of its daily instruction to cultural activities 
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and field trips in order to reap the benefits of, and contribute to, the coprosperity of Hallyu 
culture, Lucia appears to be much less committed to capitalizing off of Hallyu in this same way. 
Lucia takes work where she can – selling a logo to a company here, or teaching a calligraphy 
class there, both of which provide her with the minimal amount of income to leave her struggling 
financially and emotionally. But these gigs appear merely to provide the sustenance necessary 
for Lucia to continue doing what truly makes her happy, which is sharing her calligraphy with 
others.  
In fact, most of what Lucia does with her art seems to be carried along not by mainstream 
markets at all, but via an underground network of international artists. Lucia described to me a 
dancer that she met in Taiwan who helped her organize a festival, to which she reciprocated by 
hosting an event for her in Seoul. 
So I went to Taiwan. Everyday I moved to place, I met many person. That time I 
met one dancer. Taiwanese dancer. She really want…I met dancer…just “come to 
Seoul!” Really she came to Seoul! This time she come to Seoul during one month. 
Just I made a program: three programs. One program is talk – talk together. 
Second program is workshop and performance. Talk together is really good. But 
workshop, Lucia body condition is really bad so I cancel the workshop, but we 
make a performance. At that time…chintcha (really) really happy. 
Chamkkanmanyo (one moment please)…like this (shows me pictures on her 
phone). I make a performance during one hour. This time, Lucia have lend to 
stage. I have to pay the money, but just thinking…actually I met one person, they 
invited their house, they have very good place. I want to person this place. They 
just, “really ok!” So we make a performance that place. So, just my idea is just 
think and see the other place. I want to make a performance.  
 
 Meeting another low-profile artist like herself in Taiwan, Lucia invited this new dancer 
friend to Seoul with the intention of organizing a show where both Lucia’s calligraphy and her 
friend’s dancing could be showcased. However, the plan was not without its hiccups. On the day 
of the performance, Lucia tells how she fell ill. Sick and without a venue to hold her 
performance, Lucia searched for a place that would be within her modest budget. Then, at the 
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last minute, Lucia met another artist – a singer – who came through and opened up their home to 
Lucia and her friend as in impromptu venue. In the end, this improvised house concert drew an 
audience of 40 people according to Lucia. But for Lucia, even this humble number of people has 
the potential to sustain this underground economy. 
I guess in the world, in the musician, and the artist, really difficult. So I have one 
idea. Just I met many artists. I said to many artists, “one artist is really weak. But I 
know you, you know me. So we…I want to make a connection.” So, I met many 
person, just I want to make a Facebook friend, they see my Facebook. Sometimes 
I went to Taiwan. Taiwan friend see my Facebook (and they say), “oh Lucia came 
to Taiwan! Make an event and make something!” So one artist very weak, but 
connection…make a connection, we have a very strong power. So sometimes I 
know top level person, sometimes they think, they know Lucia, they really know 
Lucia don’t have money, just Lucia have a mind. “How Lucia very pleasure? 
Everyday happiness? How can you do? Just Lucia smiling.” So, in the world, 
circle is just an economist’s circle; money circle. I want to make a dream circle. 
So, at first I met the other person, just wonder what is your dream. Just Lucia 
listen. Sometimes, “oh maybe you come to Seoul, I will help you.” I have no 
money but I have idea, so sometimes I want to introduce my friend to place. So 
we can make an event and something. 
 
 From this last blurb, we see further into the mechanics that make possible this 
underground art community, and the meaning that it creates for Lucia. As opposed to a mode of 
production that thrives on the indiscriminate selling of cultural products – an arrangement 
augmented by a base of consumers who chase “the whole package,” and by a chain of producers 
and intermediaries whose collective goal is to elaborate and naturalize a repertoire of Hallyu 
products; an arrangement Lucia might call “an economist’s circle” – the system that Lucia 
describes seems to find its legitimacy within an underground network of artists and potential 
audiences, who share a mutual and genuine appreciation of making art happen. Strewn across an 
international constellation of cities and people, kept in constant contact via social media, and 
fortified through face-to-face interactions, this “dream circle” finds its power in reaching out to 
feel for the needs of its community, making events, and meeting new friends, all for their own 
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sake. Regardless of whether Lucia finds financial success in this process, and arguably, precisely 
because money has a minimal bearing on this process, Lucia continues to find “pleasure,” 
“happiness,” and “power.”  
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3. Conclusion 
My particular relationship to Korea, fostered by my past professional and personal 
interests, made my academic experience at Sogang University especially fascinating. As 
someone confined to a particular set of experiences, made possible by my relegation to certain 
places and spaces in Korea, and reinforced by a specific network of people and images, I seemed 
to have almost completely avoided an entire collection of representations that many of my KIP 
colleagues had assumed as natural. Then, by witnessing how KIP was apparently reinforcing this 
collection of images that was unfamiliar to me, I began to seriously inquire into the potentially 
powerful structuring effect that an over saturation of popular culture could achieve; an effect that 
seemed to render all competing ways of being inoperable.  
The classic Frankfurt debate over the meaning of popular culture, because of its uncanny 
attention to both the economic machinations of popular culture that can give structure, and to the 
revolutionary potential of mass reproduction, seemed to be the most viable framework through 
which to interpret my experiences. Adorno’s idea of standardization seemed applicable since it, 
through the relationship between producer and consumer and capitalism’s tendency towards 
profitability, promised to account for our arrival at a particular set of mainstream conventions. In 
a mode of production where a few have the power to craft a set of standards and disseminate 
standardized products to mass audiences who seek the relief that these products offer, Adorno 
explains the process of popular culture production and the cultural forms that it produces as the 
inevitable conclusion to capitalist relations.  
However, as this debate unfolds, I have shown that there is more room for flexibility in 
this arrangement than Adorno’s framework would suggest. Benjamin contends that art, precisely 
because of its mass reproduction, implicates those who consume it. No longer confined to a 1:1 
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arrangement of a single product confined to a single place of presentation, the piece of art – as a 
musical composition, an image, a story, or an item – is, in its quantity, imbued with a new 
dynamic. Mass audiences, predisposed to their particular demands, seemingly have a say in the 
form that cultural products take. And, as Shinhee Lee (2006) has shown in her work on the 
linguistic crossing and code switching of K-pop idols, idols, in their unique position within the 
division of labor of K-pop, have the ability to push back against the ideological parameters of 
Korean society through language – a gesture that finds its potential in its ability to reach mass 
audiences. Combined, Benjamin and Lee allow us to see how consumers and laborers alike also 
have a place in the formation of popular culture. 
Counter to Adorno’s original theorization, I have instead adopted a framework that sees 
popular culture not as a wholly repressive phenomenon, but as what musicologist Reebee 
Garofalo has called a “contested field.” The cultural products that we encounter, and the meaning 
imbued in them, whether they be music, art, or language, are not merely the result of the craft of 
a privileged few, but are the negotiated results of a contestation between a field of presumable 
actors and agendas.  
Then, by keeping in mind that subcultures, wherever they may be found, must still work 
within the parameters of their parent cultures, I have contended that dominant groups seem to 
mostly retain the power to define the terms of their societies. Thus, even in Adorno’s idea of 
serious music, those who have supposedly become disillusioned by their marginalization are 
unable to imagine terms outside of their parent culture, nor are they able to procure materials 
outside of it. Still, based on ethnographic findings, subcultures do appear to be able to maintain, 
however negligible, capsulized and/or parallel maps of meaning which they use to cope with 
their positions. 
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Indeed, most everywhere I looked at Sogang and at KIP, I found reason to believe that 
individuals and entities were acting on behalf of a dominant class or culture. I argued, via Choi 
and others, that nearly every Korean industry enjoys a collective benefit by aligning with Hallyu, 
a dynamic so dauntingly omnipresent at KIP that it could be observed in many of our cultural 
activities and even by the presence of cultural activities themselves. KIP’s very curriculum, 
which divided our day into “language” and “culture” classes and neglected our language 
instruction at the privilege of cultural instruction, was the first indication to me that KIP had 
compromised its pedagogical integrity in the face of Hallyu. KIP, acting has a hub for foreign 
audiences, through its partitioning of our day into language and culture was able to both segue 
fans of K-pop and dramas into other cultural interests like language, art, history, and sports, 
while also introducing those with business and academic interests to idols and dancing. Each of 
these individual cultural activities, presented as “authentic Korean culture,” therefore worked to 
build a co-constitutive Korean brand that contributes to the lucrative viability of Hallyu and 
Korean culture.  
Still, even within this arrangement, I found people asserting their agency and/or thriving 
within the disjuncture and slippage of strict capitalist relations. My roommate Andrew showed 
me that even as a fan of K-pop – an industry constantly innovating in order to attract foreign 
audiences – he asserted his own discriminating tastes when deciding what he sought from artists 
and performers. He described how fan/idol interfaces like Vlive allow international fans to 
provide feedback to idols in real time while also gaining the emotional attention that they seek 
from their favorite idols. This collective power of international audiences, just as predicted by 
Benjamin, allows the fans themselves to significantly shape the K-pop industry. I observed this 
dynamic at KIP amongst my colleagues, whom through their own collective choice to converge 
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with each other via English – a fact owed to their unique positions as international students – 
shaped the very the nature of our program and likewise the shape and potency of Hallyu.  
 But, perhaps the most striking example of a thriving subculture that I found – one that 
existed within the constricting boundaries of Hallyu, yet fostered an alternative economy and 
system of meaning within these boundaries – was through Lucia.  
 Even my initial frustration with KIP’s inconsistent adherence to our language contracts 
began to make sense after chewing over my interaction with Lucia. Just as many of our culture 
classes reverted to English, seemingly to better convey their own messages, Lucia too reverted to 
English when speaking to me. She answered some of my simpler and more straight forward 
questions in Korean, perhaps conceding that there was little at stake. However, when sparked by 
a topic that interested her, and burdened by the urgency to convey her feelings to me, Lucia 
reverted to English. From a subcultural perspective, Lucia’s use of English, with me and with the 
others she meets abroad, can be seen as an appropriation of the tools of the parent culture for a 
subcultural purpose. English, as the granted universal language, coupled with technological 
platforms like Facebook, can be used by Lucia to reach larger audiences, expose her art to more 
people, and facilitate her underground network in subversion to the dominant global culture that 
English belongs to. 
Similar to the other culture classes that KIP presented us to, Lucia serves an important 
function for the branding of Korean and/or Hallyu culture. Her calligraphy provides a unique 
visual representation of Korean culture that has been co-opted by an internationally recognized 
Korean soju company, and by KIP, who strategically places Lucia alongside other “authentic” 
Korean cultural representations. And though Lucia’s art may help to fortify the Korean brand in 
this way, her refusal to fully commit to the naturalized supremacy of Hallyu renders her 
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economically marginalized within this arrangement. When necessary, she sells her services and 
likeness to companies and institutions like KIP. But, Lucia’s participation in Korea’s culture 
industry is merely a springboard for her true source of happiness: sharing her art. Coming to 
terms with her relationship to what she calls the “economist’s circle,” Lucia searches for 
happiness not in following the lucrative pathway set out before her by Hallyu, but through the 
connections she makes abroad. Through a series of spontaneous friendships and connections, 
Lucia travels the world, organizing art shows for whomever will come. Along the way, Lucia 
opens her ears to the people she meets, listening to their dreams and often returning their 
hospitality by inviting them to Seoul.  
 In Lucia’s final story, when she invited a dancer from Taiwan to perform in Seoul, we see 
the power that her underground network can sustain. When Lucia fell ill at the last minute, her 
planned collaborative performance, for a moment, seemed lost. Without the money to pay for a 
proper venue, nor the ability for Lucia to perform herself, it seemed like the event would have to 
be cancelled. But, through a happenstance invitation by a local singer, Lucia and the visiting 
dancer were able to secure their performance location at the singer’s house and uphold the event. 
Through a seemingly shared goal to fulfill each other’s dreams; to make art happen; Lucia and 
these low-profile artists seemed unconcerned with profiting from their art. To the contrary, this 
network of underground artists seem to risk it all, living on the economic margins for their trade, 
taking risks by travelling abroad to organize shows with nothing but the support and promotion 
of Facebook and word of mouth, pulling together makeshift venues, and drawing only small 
audiences – all seemingly for the sake of seeing their friends’ dreams fulfilled, their art to be 
seen, and to share a cup of tea together. It is this dream circle, which thrives in the face of 
standardization, that I find to be the most admirable example of subcultural existence. 
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Epilogue 
 
As I hope this thesis has shown, KIP serves as a unique window through which we are 
able to observe some of the dynamics that enable particular forms, practices, images, and people 
to stand in as granted expressions of Korean culture, and how Hallyu in particular is able to reach 
far into realms of interest outside of music, television, and entertainment. Korean language 
education, as an area of interest that has traditionally stood outside the realm of Hallyu, makes 
for an interesting case study as it reveals the processes by which Hallyu opens up new fronts for 
interfacing with the global market. The short duration of the program, in a way, may have 
exaggeratedly highlighted these processes since cultural representations must be condensed in a 
way that allows them to be quickly and effectively delivered to foreign audiences. However, 
precisely because KIP occupies such a short temporal space in the ongoing processes of Hallyu, I 
wonder still about what the larger implications and long-term effects of Hallyuization might be.  
 Benjamin asserted that in the process of removing the work of art from its ritual origin, it 
would also lose its “aura” – its unique magical quality that gave it “authenticity” (1969, 6). 
Following Benjamin’s line of reasoning, John and Jean Comaroff speculate about what this 
might mean for the number of nations, ethnic groups, and indigenous communities worldwide 
whom also face decisions regarding the marketability of their communities (2009, 24-28). Will 
the mass reproduction of an alienable essence, lead to the loss of a community’s “mystique,” 
thereby tokenizing them (26)? Will the mystique become transformed? Might the “consumer as 
producer” dynamic that Benjamin alludes to, mean that ethnic and national identities necessarily 
depend on (international) consumers for their mystique (27)? If so, does this dependency 
eventually lead to communities as producers reimagining themselves in the terms of their 
consumers (27)? Furthermore, will there remain a distinction between an “identity-as-self-
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possession” (27), and an identity that has merely met the demands of the market by branding 
itself in “universally recognizable terms” (24)? Although my time at KIP has given us an 
exclusive view into how this “consumer as producer” dynamic can play out in terms of how 
certain cultural forms become privileged and how the shape of these forms are negotiated, 
revealing in the process, something about how Hallyu operates, I recognize its limits and hope 
that it may inspire other avenues of inquiry such as the processes of identity formation and of 
global feedback loops. Such inquiries I believe will benefit from sustained and long-term 
investigations.  
 As I write this in the winter of 2019, nearly a year after I first registered for KIP 2018, 
new clues are beginning to emerge that might allow us to speculate about the trajectory and long-
term implications of my findings. Via their official Facebook page, KIP recently announced the 
opening of registration for KIP 2019.  
 Dear our students, Hello! This is Sogang KIP from Sogang University. 
The registration for 2019 KIP program will begin from now on. 
Recommendations from our KIP students have been great motive for our 
program. We are honored to be spread by word-of-mouth to students who are very 
interested in Korean Culture, K-POP, and Korean Language. Thank you so much 
for your participation and efforts made in Sogang University. Thank you 
  
 The post seemed to both reaffirm some of my own conclusions and offer room for new 
interpretation. Just as I had observed how my KIP colleagues seemed to prefer a comfortable 
interface with Korea as a cohort of outsiders whom could maintain their loquaciousness via 
English, so too does this post suggest that “word-of-mouth” communication has been an 
effective means by which foreigners may reaffirm their Korean experience. The flexibility of our 
culture classes to permit the use of English seems to have allowed students to enjoy all of the 
offered activities in a way that was most comfortable to them; an effective means of deploying 
“Korean culture” that in turn may have informed the recommendations of my colleagues.  
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 Further, I am once again intrigued by KIP’s ambiguous use of the terms “Korean 
Culture” and “Korean Language”; this time teased apart quite unambiguously from the term “K-
POP.” Juxtaposed against previous years’ promotional materials, which emphasized first and 
foremost KIP as a program for people interested in Korean language, this promotion, for the first 
time, unapologetically places Korean Culture and K-pop antecedent to Korean Language. 
Certainly, there could be several ways of interpreting this. KIP might be consciously beginning 
to place “Korean Culture” and K-pop at the fore of the program rather than as secondary 
supporters for language. The ordinal placement may have been a kind of Freudian slip, 
representing the unconscious recognition of a natural order that values Hallyu above the rest. Or, 
the choice of terms might be arbitrary, their ordinal placement owed merely to chance.  
 However, what does strike me as significant about this promotion is the seemingly 
updated distance that Korean culture and Korean language have both taken next to K-pop. No 
longer conflated with culture, K-pop now appears as its own category. In thinking about the 
future of Hallyu and what its presumable growing commodification might mean for how 
Koreans think of themselves, this nominal separation that has been made between K-pop, Korean 
language, and Korean culture gives me reason to believe that there are some realms into which 
K-pop will not be permitted to enter.  
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